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Abstract
Machine learning models have been found to be vulnerable to adversarial at-
tacks that apply small perturbations to input samples to get them misclas-
sified. Attacks that search for and apply the perturbations are performed in
both white-box and black-box settings, depending on the information avail-
able to the attacker about the target. For black-box attacks, the attacker can
only query the target with specially crafted inputs and observing the outputs
returned by the model. These outputs are used to guide the perturbations
and create adversarial examples that are then misclassified.
Current black-box attacks on API-based malware classifiers rely solely on
feature insertion when applying perturbations. This restriction is set in place
to ensure that no changes are introduced to the malware’s originally intended
functionality. Additionally, the API calls being inserted in the malware are
null or no-op APIs that have no functional affect to avoid any unintentional
impact on malware behavior. Due to the nature of these API calls, they can
be easily detected through non-ML techniques by analyzing their arguments
and return values.
In this dissertation, we explore other attacks on API-based malware detec-
tion models that are not restricted to feature addition. Specifically, we explore
feature replacement as a possible avenue for creating adversarial malware ex-
amples. To retain the malware’s original functionality, we replace API calls
iv
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with other functionally equivalent API calls. We find the API alternatives
by using a hierarchical unsupervised learning approach on the API’s docu-
mentation. Our attack, which we call AdversarialPSO, uses Particle Swarm
Optimization to guide the perturbations according to available function alter-
natives. Results show that creating adversarial malware examples by feature
replacement is possible even under the more restrictive search space of limited
function alternatives.
Unlike the malware domain, which lacks benchmark datasets and publicly
available classification models, image classification has multiple benchmarks
to test new attacks. Therefore, to evaluate the efficacy and wide-applicability
of AdversarialPSO, we re-implement the attack in the image classification
domain, where we create adversarial examples from images by adding small
often unrecognizable perturbations to the inputs. As a result of these pertur-
bations, highly-accurate models misclassify the inputs resulting in a drastic
drop in their accuracy. We evaluate this attack against both defended and
undefended models and show that AdversarialPSO performs comparably to
state-of-the-art adversarial attacks.
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With the proliferation of electronic devices and the ever-increasing dependency
on technology, malware has become an attractive tool for malicious activities.
As reported by Kaspersky Lab [39], approximately 717 million malware at-
tacks were detected by the anti-virus (AV) tool in the second quarter of 2019
alone. The increase in malware sightings worldwide is largely due to their
profitability, where malware authors realize gains through black-market sales
of malware, selling stolen data, or from ransom payments demanded after ran-
somware attacks. This increase in malicious software activity threatens the
online safety of both organizations and individuals alike.
Machine learning (ML) has been extensively explored in the malware liter-
ature as a possible avenue for better and more reliable detection. In fact,
it has already been incorporated in many commercial anti-malware prod-
ucts [40,49,77]. This adoption is attributed to the highly accurate and general-
izable predictions offered by ML. The utility of ML has been demonstrated in
many different faucets of malware analysis and detection, such as the classifica-
tion of malware to their families (e.g., Zbot, Koobface, Banker, and Virut) [26],
quantifying the similarity between different malware samples [14], and detect-
ing variants spawned from the same malware roots [81].
Despite state-of-the-art performances, ML models have been shown to suf-
fer from a general flaw that makes them vulnerable to external attack. Adver-
saries can manipulate models to misclassify inputs by applying small pertur-
bations to the samples [78]. These adversarial examples have been successfully
demonstrated in the image classification domain against real-world black-box
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targets, where adversaries would perform remote queries on a classifier to de-
velop and verify their attack samples [60]. These attackers were later adopted
in the malware field to create adversarial malware examples that evades ML
detection [13,18,24,68]. The possibility of such attacks poses a significant risk
to any ML application, especially in security-critical settings or life-threatening
environments.
Early adversarial attacks relied on model gradients to craft adversarial
examples [11, 17, 61], which requires internal knowledge of the target model.
Such information is available in a white-box attack but not in a black-box set-
ting. This led some black-box attacks to rely on the ability of some adversarial
examples to transfer from one model to another [60]. These attacks train a
local surrogate that approximates the target’s decision boundary to craft ad-
versarial examples. Adversarial examples crafted on the local surrogate are
then transferred to the remote target where they would also be misclassified.
Transfer-based attacks however, were shown to be ineffective [12], which led
to the exploration of other types of attacks that do not require a surrogate.
These methods attack the model directly by either estimating the model gradi-
ents [6,12,29,30] or by iteratively applying perturbations to the input, guided
by certain algorithms [2, 21,52].
In practice, the feasibility of a black-box attack also depends heavily on
the number of required queries submitted to the model. Against machine-
learning-as-a-service (MLaaS) platforms like Google Vision, each query has
a monetary cost. Too many queries make the attack costly. Perhaps more
importantly, too many queries could trigger a monitor to detect an attack
underway by observing many subtly modified versions of the same input sub-
mitted to the system in a short period. To evade such a monitor, one could
conduct the attack very slowly or use a large number of accounts that all have
different credit cards attached and different IP addresses. Either approach
would significantly add to the real-world costs of conducting the attack.
Malware and images are inherently different and their attacks are bound
by different constraints. The main constraint when generating adversarial
examples from images is the distance from the original input, which must
not be too large that the semantic meaning of the image is lost. In other
words, changes made to the image to create the adversarial example must not
distort the image so that objects in the image are no longer recognizable. For
malware on the other hand, the constraint is to create adversarial examples
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that maintain the malware’s original functionality. Put differently, changes
made to the malware must not change the output of running the malware on
a victim machine.
To maintain this constraint when creating adversarial malware examples,
researchers limit perturbations to feature additions, which ensures that mal-
ware functionality would remain intact [13,18,24,68]. Attacks for both static-
based models [13, 18] and for dynamic-based models [24, 68] have generally
avoided feature replacement and removal to maintain the functionality of the
malware. However, limiting perturbations to feature additions introduces a
weakness that makes the attack detectable. As the features being inserted
must maintain the malware’s functionality, they consist exclusively of no-op
or null features that have no effect. As such, these features can be detected
by scanning the binary for extraneous artifacts or by analyzing the behavioral
artifacts that are produced when running the malware in a sandbox [64].
In the case of dynamic ML-based malware detection models, specifically
those that use API calls, samples are first executed in a sandbox and mon-
itored before they are classified by an ML model. Analyzing the arguments
being passed to the API calls and the return values they produce, could help
determine which API calls are no-ops that do not contribute to the software’s
intended goals [64]. For example, if an API call returns a value that is not
used later during malware execution, then that API call serves no purpose and
can be safely removed. Another more specific example is if a file is opened
using OpenFile (returns a file handle) but is not followed by a ReadFile or a
WriteFile (both require a file handle as a parameter), then that API call can
be safely removed. As a consequence, attacks that depend on inserting null
API calls into the malware call sequence are easily detectable using non-ML
techniques.
This weakness in API insertion attacks led us to explore a more robust
approach for creating adversarial examples. Specifically, we aim to answer the
following Research Question (RQ):
• RQ1: How can adversarial examples for API-based malware detection
models be created without relying solely on null feature insertion?
To answer RQ1, we pursue a method that is capable of replacing API calls
made by the malware with functionally equivalent API calls. We design an
attack, which we call AdversarialPSO, that is capable of generating adversarial
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examples from malware without being limited to feature additions. This attack
would ensure that all API calls made by the malware would be relevant, and
detecting such calls during dynamic analysis would be much more difficult
than detecting null or no-op API calls. Chapter 5, describes our findings for
answering RQ1.
AdversarialPSO uses Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO)—a gradient-free
optimization technique—to craft adversarial examples. PSO maintains a pop-
ulation of candidate solutions called particles. Each particle moves in the
search space seeking better solutions to the problem based on a fitness func-
tion that we have designed for finding adversarial examples. PSO has been
shown to quickly converge on good (though not globally optimal) solutions [74],
making it very suitable for finding adversarial examples in a black-box setting,
as it can identify sufficiently good examples with few queries.
One frequently cited challenge when performing research in the malware
domain is the lack of benchmark datasets and publicly available models. This
however, is not a issue in the image classification domain. Many adversarial
attacks are first proposed for image classification models and are later adapted
to malware detection models. This led us to wonder about how well our attack
would fare against state-of-the-art attacks in image classification. Although
the two domains are inherently different, which we discuss further in Sec-
tion 4.2, it would nonetheless be insightful to evaluate the PSO-based attack
under different constraints. This would help determine which aspects of our
attack requires further attention, thus guiding our future work in this area.
We therefore pursue a second research question RQ2, which is as following:
• RQ2: Can the AdversarialPSO attack, which is designed for API-based
malware detection models, be effectively adapted for image classification
models?
In answering RQ2, we determined that the attack algorithm itself performs
comparably to state-of-the-art attacks in image classification, and any effort to
improve the malware attack would be better spent in finding or implementing
more functionally-equivalent API calls. We report our findings for RQ2 in
Chapter 6.
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Contributions and Summary
To better understand why ML is actively being explored in current malware re-
search, in Chapter 2, we provide a brief background on traditional approaches
for malware analysis and detection. We also disuss why traditional approaches
are no longer sufficient in the current malware landscape. Furthermore, we
discuss how ML is used to overcome the shortcomings of traditional malware
detection approaches and we provide a brief introduction on adversarial ML
and the different adversarial threat models.
Essentially, the primary focus of this dissertation is to explore robust at-
tacks against commonly used malware detection models. For this evaluation,
we trained a ML model on API call sequences collected from both malware
and benignware- an approach often used in the malware literature. Chapter 3
provides further details on the malware detection model we developed for this
study.
The attack we designed, called AdversarialPSO, is a black-box attack
that creates adversarial examples for malware detection models. We use the
population-based evolutionary search algorithm Particle Swarm Optimization
as a basis for our attack. The AdversarialPSO attack generates adversarial
examples by making targeted changes to a malware’s API call sequence using
the PSO algorithm. Also, as the original functionality of the malware must be
retained, the attack replaces API calls made by the malware with function-
ally equivalent API calls. AdversarialPSO, including our process for finding
functionally equivalent APIs, are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.
As the malware domain lacks both benchmark datasets and publicly avail-
able models, it is thus difficult to evaluate the efficacy of the attack on reliable
baselines. Therefore, we also test the attack in the image classification domain,
which contains several benchmarks. This allows us to compare the effective-
ness and practicality of the attack under different constraints. One example
of how the two domains are different is that, unlike malware, which are repre-
sented by discrete features, images reside in a continuous feature-space. This
requires adapting our original AdversarialPSO attack, which was initially de-
signed to operate on discrete features, to work on images. The results of using
this attack on image classification models is presented in Chapter 6.
The main contributions of this study are as following:
• We design and evaluate a feature replacement attack against API-based
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 6
malware detection models
• We explore methods for finding functionally equivalent APIs that could
be used in feature replacement attacks
• We evaluate the attack in the image classification domain and show
that our attack performs comparably to the state-of-the-art in image




In this chapter, we first provide some background on traditional malware de-
tection approaches, how ML is used to detect malware, and some introductory
concepts in the field of adversarial ML. We then review the literature that is
related to our work.
2.1 Background
2.1.1 Traditional Approaches for Malware Analysis and De-
tection
To detect malware, we currently rely on AV software to scan and clean our sys-
tems. The vast majority of those AVs use approaches that can be easily evaded
by malware. Namely, they use signatures from previously seen malware, often
in the form byte sequences and hash digests, to detect future sightings of the
same malware. Although these approaches are indispensable for the detec-
tion of many known malware variants, they fail when encountering recently
developed malware with unknown signatures, commonly known as zero-days.
Additionally, malware authors often use obfuscation techniques, such as poly-
morphism, metamorphism, and packing, to modify malware signatures and
evade AV detection. With these vulnerabilities, traditional signature-based
approaches for detecting malware has become insufficient on their own and
7
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therefore must be supplemented with other detection methods.
An alternative to using signatures for malware detection is the use of be-
havior, that of both malware and benign software. Using behavior to detect
malware can be done by either looking for deviancy from normal system behav-
ior, or by searching for similarities to known malicious behavior. The former,
known as anomaly-based detection, is done by setting a threshold for nor-
mal system activities and raising an alarm whenever that threshold is crossed.
The latter on the other hand, involves executing the malware in isolated en-
vironments and monitoring their behavior. The observed behavior is used to
detect software that show similarities to known malware activities. Although
better in detecting unknown and obfuscated malware than signature-based de-
tection, behavioral-based approaches have weaknesses that affect their broad
applicability. Examples of those weaknesses include high false positive rates,
moving thresholds due to new applications and usage patterns, the extensive
resources required to execute and observe the malware, and the inability to
directly invoke all malware execution paths. The weaknesses of both signature-
based and behavioral-based approaches prompted researchers to explore other
avenues for better malware detection.
Researchers saw potential in ML to provide solutions that overcome the
weaknesses of signature-based and behavioral-based malware detection. ML
has been already proven in other fields as an indispensable tool that provides
highly accurate predictions, and based on that, researcher explored its adop-
tion in the malware domain. Studies that use ML in the malware field are
often categorized according to the objective of the study, the features used,
and the ML techniques being utilized [80]. The most common objective is
the detection of malware, which aims to classify processes as either malicious
or benign. For the remainder of this dissertation, we consider this objective
as our primary focus for malware classification. We will discuss the different
types of features in the next section, but we refer the readers to the survey by
Ucci et al. [80] for a more detailed discussion on the different ML techniques
used in the malware field.
2.1.2 Machine Learning in the Malware Domain
There are two types of features when training ML models for malware detect-
ing: static-based and behavioral-based features. Static features are extracted
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directly from software binaries without executing the samples, such as oper-
ational code (opcode) sequences [72], Control Flow Graphs(CFG) [3], header
information [47], and byte entropy [73]. The challenge when using static fea-
tures is handling the obfuscation, packing, and encryption that is often used by
malware developers. Without addressing these evasive measures, the extrac-
tion of static features will fail to provide meaningful intelligence to the learning
algorithms. Although there are methods to overcome these challenges, they
are rarely universal and would often require some manual work, which hinders
the scalability and portability of the models.
Behavioral-based features on the other hand, requires running the mal-
ware in sandboxes to extract the necessary features. Examples of behavioral
features include API calls [22], network activity [56], memory usage [67], and
file system activity [51]. This approach is vulnerable to anti-sandbox tech-
nology [50], which if not addressed, could pollute the dataset with mislabeled
data points. For samples that use anti-sandbox or environment-aware tech-
nology, executing the malware in a sandbox would fail to invoke their original
behavior. In those instances, if the malware detects any trace of an analysis
environment, they would simply terminate or limit their behavior to benign
activities. Behavioral-based features also suffer from incomplete coverage of
malware code. When malware is executed, only a single execution path is
taken in each run, whereas many possible paths could still exist in the code.
Without a complete picture of all potential behaviors within the malware, the
ML models would be trained with a narrow view of the feature-space.
There are avenues that combine both static and behavioral features, and
are less vulnerable to obfuscation. One such avenue is memory, which rep-
resents the runtime state of the computer system in a single point in time.
Any software that executes must pass through memory in its native form be-
fore executing. In other words, encrypted software must decrypt and packed
executables must unpack. This offers an opportunity to extract both static
and behavioral features while overcoming some of the challenges that are often
encountered when analyzing malware. Features could also be extracted from
memory images instead of a live system, this would ensure that no live mal-
ware is tampering with the analysis process. The applications of this however,
might be limited as memory analysis and artifact extraction could be time-
consuming and resource-intensive. In Section 2.2.1, we discuss our previous
work in memory-based malware detection and the benefits it may offer to the
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field of computer forensics.
2.1.3 Adversarial Machine Learning
Although ML could effectively detect malware in non-hostile settings, its ro-
bustness could still be questioned when the models come under attack. Re-
cently, the research community has shown great interest in the area of ad-
versarial ML [5, 17, 75, 79]. In short, the goal of this field is to subvert ML
models and cause them to misclassify inputs. The mere possibility of these
kind of attacks can have a large impact on the applicability of ML in any
domain, especially malware detection. If malware developers can evade detec-
tion by making small targeted changes to their malware, this would place any
ML-based malware detection model under direct threat of subversion.
Adversarial ML attacks are categorized using three dimensions: influence
(specifies the attacker’s capabilities), security violation (integrity, availability,
or privacy), and specificity (the breadth of the attack) [58]. The combina-
tion of the aforementioned dimensions creates the threat model of the attack.
Specifying the threat model is essential when conducting research in the ad-
versarial ML domain, both from the attacker’s perspective and that of the
defender’s.
The first dimension in an adversarial threat model is the attacker’s ca-
pabilities. An attacker can have influence on the training data and launch
an attack before the model is trained. These attacks are known as poisoning
attacks [58], as they aim to influence the model’s decision by poisoning the
training set. Without influence on the training data, the attacker is left with
exploratory capabilities, which limits the attacker’s control to manipulating
the test samples and querying an already trained model for feedback. Attacks
of this type are often launched in a black-box setting where the attacker has no
knowledge of the target [60]. It is important to consider the number of queries
submitted to the model when launching exploratory attacks. If an attack sub-
mits too many queries, it might raise suspicion. It is therefore essential for
these type of attacks to use limited queries for them to be practical.
Another dimension to consider when categorizing adversarial attacks is the
security policy being violated by the attacker. When attacking the availabil-
ity of the model, the attacker aims to render the model completely useless by
producing misclassifications on all or most test samples. On the other hand,
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attacks on integrity only aims to misclassify specific samples, which conse-
quently, will reduce the overall confidence of the model. Finally, by attacking
the privacy of the model, an attacker attempts to leak information from the
training data by exploiting design flaws in the model itself.
The third and final dimension is the breadth or specificity of the attack.
This dimension specifies the amount of samples targeted by the attacker, where
the goal is to either misclassify specific samples or to indiscriminately target
all samples. This dimension is closely related to the security policy dimension,
where specific and indiscriminate attacks would indirectly lead to attacks on
integrity and availability, respectively. Furthermore, specificity and influence
are also related, as depending on the attacker’s capabilities, different attacks
would directly influence either specific samples or all samples. For example,
if the attacker launches a poisoning attack that influences the model’s deci-
sion boundary, any sample classified by the model would be affected by this
change, which would make it an indiscriminate attack. On the other hand, if
the attacker can only perturb certain features in the input sample, then the
changes would only affect that sample.
Adversarial ML has been studied in the domains of image recognition [60],
speech and voice recognition [1], and also in security [13, 18, 83]. ML models
in each of these areas were successfully subverted using adversarial ML, which
bolsters the need for developing robust models that withstands external at-
tacks. Although there are multiple defenses proposed in the literature, only one
defense was found to be effective, and that is adversarial training. This defense
involves generating attack samples and incorporating them in the training set
to make the model less sensitive to adversarial perturbations [27,46].
2.2 Literature Review
To clearly present related work from the literature, we separate the review
into the following three sections: malware detection, adversarial ML, and
adversarial ML in the malware domain.
2.2.1 Malware Detection
The malware detection ML literature can be divided according to the type
of features used to train the ML models. Malware can be represented using
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two types of features: static features (e.g., binary n-grams, opcode sequences,
and metadata), and dynamic features (e.g., DNS requests, accessed files, and
registry activity). The main difference between the two is the method used
to capture the data- static features are collected without executing the mal-
ware while dynamic features requires executing the malware and monitoring
their behavior. ML models can be trained using one of the types exclusively
or by combining the two to provide the model with a more complete view
of the feature space. Hybrid approaches that use both static and dynamic
features often perform better, but they incur a higher overhead for feature
extraction and selection. On the other hand, having multiple feature sets offer
the opportunity to train a Multi-Classifier System (MCS) that would be more
robust than a single classifier. Although the work in this dissertation focuses
on dynamic-based malware detection, we include static-based approaches for
the sake of completeness.
Malware Detection using Static Features
A compiled program is represented by a sequence of opcodes and operands that
are executed by the CPU. In essence, opcodes are the instructions that make up
the program’s operations and the operands are the parameters used by those
opcodes. In a study by Bilar, a significant statistical difference in opcode usage
was found between benignware and malware [7]. Based on this, Santos et al.
used Term Frequency (TF) to extract features from opcode sequences and
Mutual Information (MI) to select the most relevant features [72]. Using the
frequencies and relevance scores, the authors built a Support Vector Machine
(SVM) classifier based on a normalized polynomial kernel, which achieved an
accuracy of 95.9%.
More et al. explore ensemble voting techniques for malware detection [53].
The features they use consisted of opcode data extracted using n-grams, over-
lapping n-grams, and sliding window. They reduce the number of features
using Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) by selecting
the n most highest scoring features. The authors then test multiple voting
schemes including majority voting, veto voting, and trust-based veto voting
in their ensemble methods for malware detection. They found trust-based
veto voting to achieve the best performance on their dataset, with the highest
accuracy being 89.7% on overlapping n-gram features.
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To classify binaries as benign or malicious, the authors of [66] used raw
byte sequences extracted directly from binary files. Over two million time
steps were used to represent each binary, which imposed unique challenges
to the authors. Once the byte sequences were extracted, the authors used
Convolution Neural Networks (CNN) with global max pooling to classify bi-
naries as malicious or benign. The purpose of the study was not to achieve
high-detection rates, but to explore the challenges of using long sequences
and to identify sub-regions in the binary that would not have been identified
otherwise.
Malware Detection using Dynamic Features
Although using static features has its advantages, it is still vulnerable to
packed and encrypted samples. As pointed out in [57] and as was demon-
strated in [36], packing, encryption, k-ary code, and multistage loaders are
challenges to static-based ML approaches. For that reason, many researchers
choose dynamic approaches for malware classification and detection. Although
dynamic approaches also have weaknesses, they are considered to be better in
generalizing to unknown malware and in the prediction of future trends.
Pirscoveanu et al. used DNS requests, accessed files, mutexes, modified reg-
istry keys, and API calls to train a Random Forest (RF) classifier for malware
detection [65]. They acquired the data using Cuckoo Sandbox while utilizing
INetSim to simulate internet connectivity. They achieved 96% accuracy with
a weighted average of 89.9% across all malware types.
AMAL, proposed by Mohaisen et al., is a behavioral-based malware clas-
sification system that characterizes samples according to filesystem, registry,
network, and memory artifacts [51]. The system consists of two subsystems,
one to run the samples and extract the features, called AutoMal, and the
other to build the classifier, called MaLabel. According to the authors, AMAL
achieved an accuracy of 99.5%. One of the strengths of AMAL is the large
training set used to build the model, where the authors used more than 115,000
samples to train their models.
Huang et al. performed multi-task learning on two objectives functions,
one for the binary classification of malware and the other for classifying mal-
ware to their respective families [28]. They utilized API call sequences and
null terminated objects recovered from system memory using anti-malware
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engines. Both objective functions were trained simultaneously using the same
architecture, which splits into two softmax layers for producing both binary
and multi-class labels. They report error rates of 0.35% for binary classifica-
tions and 2.94% for multi-class classification.
To predict the maliciousness of executables, Rhode et al. trained an en-
semble of Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN) on machine activity data, such
as total number of running processes, CPU and memory usage, and network
communications [67]. The objective of this study was to detect malware in
the first four seconds of execution. The authors report a 93% accuracy for
their model, however, they also mention an obvious counter-measure of their
approach, which is to inject benign behavior in the first few second of malware
execution.
Kolosnjaji et al. combine recurrent and convolutional layers to train a
deep learning model for malware detection [37]. They use API call sequences
to train DL models that classifies sequences to specific malware families. They
found that combining convolutional and recurrent improves the classification
of malware behavior.
Other Avenues for Malware Detection
One avenue that could benefit greatly from the utility of ML is digital forensics.
Recently, memory forensics has assumed a larger role in the digital forensics
investigative process. This process involves acquiring memory images from a
live system and analyzing them for evidence of maliciousness or malpractice.
Part of that process is to search for traces of malware on a computer system,
as in many computer crimes, malware is often involved one way or another.
Although there are many tools to assist in the analysis of memory images, it is
often a manual process that largely depends on the analysts’ expertise. This
leads to a time consuming investigation that is both resource intensive and
error-prone. To solve this problem, we propose using behavioral artifacts found
in memory images to classify processes as malicious or benign. We explore
memory artifacts such as registry keys, referenced APIs, loaded libraries, and
open handles as possible features for malware detection [54,55].
In our analysis, we found great disparity between malware and benignware
usage of memory artifacts. For example, we found that malicious processes,
on average, use more than twice as many process handles as bengin processes.
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This is a result of malware attempting to take over other process for stealth
and privilege escalation purposes. Another example is the usage of certain
API calls that are highly indicative of anti-analysis intentions. Specifically,
we found that it is more common for malware to import APIs such as Sleep
and GetTickCount than legitimate software. These APIs are often called to
evade automated analysis or to detect the presence of debuggers, respectively.
Finally, we found registry keys related to network tracing and remote access
services to be accessed more frequently by malware than benignware. The
common occurrence of such registry keys in the malware corpus could be a
result of data exfiltration operations and the preparation of victim machines
for remote access by the malware developers.
After extracting and analyzing the memory artifacts, we trained ML mod-
els to classify processes in a memory image as malicious or benign. We test
both individual classifiers for each type of artifact and an ensemble-based
classifier that aggregates individual classifications. The ensemble achieved an
accuracy of 93.39% and precision and recall of 90.58% and 96.25%, respec-
tively. Our results show that the detection of malware during the course of a
memory investigation can be automated using ML.
2.2.2 Adversarial Machine Learning
White-box Attacks
Adversarial examples were first discussed by Szegedy et al. in [79] where
they were described as an exploitation of blind spots in a neural network’s
coverage of the feature space. These blind spots cause neural networks to
become sensitive to changes in the input, where small perturbations lead to
large variations in the output. Utilizing this sensitivity, multiple algorithms
were proposed to fool classifiers into misclassifying inputs.
Goodfellow et al. argue that the linearity of neural networks is the cause of
adversarial examples. Based on this, they introduced the Fast Gradient Sign
Method (FGSM) [17]. This method, shown in 2.1, makes small changes to the
inputs towards cost function’s gradient ∇xJ(θ,X, y), which can be computed
using back-propagation.
η = εsign(∇XJ(θ,X, y)) (2.1)
Where η is the perturbation to be added to the input sample X and ε is the
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magnitude of the perturbation. The authors show that a single step towards
the gradient is often sufficient to get a sample misclassified.
Kurakin et al. [38] extend this approach by introducing an iterative variant
of FGSM that takes several smaller steps instead of a single large step. The
authors also evaluate the persistence of both FGSM and its iterative variant in
the physical world. To do so, they print out adversarial examples and classify
the images by feeding them to a model through a camera. They found that
adversarial attacks are possible even in the physical world.
Another approach is the Jacobian-based Saliency Map Approach (JSMA)
proposed by Papernot et al. [62]. In contrast to FGSM, which makes small
changes to a large number of features, JSMA makes large changes to a small
number of features. The method, shown in 2.2, determines which features to
modify by creating an adversarial saliency map generated from the Jacobian of
the network. JSMA can be used in a targeted attack where perturbations can
be made to misclassify a sample to a specific class. Both FGSM and JSMA
were used in [60] to launch a black-box attack on a remote model. The attack
depends on the transferability phenomena discussed in [61], where adversarial
examples generated for one model would transfer to another model, even if the
two models have different architectures or were trained using different learning
algorithms. This allowed the authors of [60] to train a local surrogate classifier
that approximates the decision boundary of the target. The surrogate was then
used to generate adversarial examples using JSMA and FGSM, which would
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Where S(X, t)[i] is the saliency map created to misclassify input sample X
as target class label t and where i is an input feature.
At the time of writing, the state-of-the-art in white-box adversarial attacks
was the Carlini & Wagner attack (C&W) [11], in which the authors search for
adversarial examples by iteratively performing
minimize D(x, x + δ), where D is either an L0, L2, or L 8 distance metric.
The attack finds the minimum distance required to generate an adversarial
example according to the distance metric being minimized. The attack defeats
the defensive distillation approach proposed by Papernot et al. [62].
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Black-box Attacks
In a black-box attack, the attacker does not know the internals of a target
model. Instead, the attacker can query the target with specially crafted in-
puts. Target models are assumed to return confidence scores along with each
classification, which is then used in constructing inputs for subsequent queries.
These inputs are crafted to estimate gradient or to lead to generating misclas-
sification samples gradually.
Gradient-Estimation Attacks: To launch black-box attacks on image
classification models, Chen et al. propose ZOO [12], a method to estimate
model gradients using only the model inputs and the corresponding confi-
dence scores provided by the model. The approach employs a finite difference
method that evaluates image coordinates after adding a small perturbation
to estimate the direction of the gradient for each coordinate. However, as
examining every coordinate does require a large number of evaluations, the
authors applied the stochastic coordinate descent algorithm and attack-space
dimension reduction to reduce the number of evaluations needed to approxi-
mate gradients. Small perturbations added to the direction of the gradient,
which, as shown in the FGSM attack, are sufficient to obtain an adversarial
example from the input. Although it can successfully create adversarial exam-
ples indistinguishable from the inputs, the ZOO attack requires up to a million
queries for high-dimensional data such as Imagenet. With so many queries,
the attack could be easily detectable, and the cost could be prohibitive and
impractical in a real-world setting for a single image.
To mitigate the large number of queries required by ZOO, Bhagoji et al.
estimate the gradient of groups of features or coordinates instead of estimating
one coordinate at a time [6]. Although the attack was not evaluated on a high-
dimensional dataset, it outperformed ZOO on low-dimensional datasets such
as CIFAR-10 and MNIST. The proposed Gradient Estimation (GE) approach
used by the authors still requires up to 10 thousand queries to generate an
adversarial example. The authors considered PSO as a possible approach for
searching adversarial examples but found it to be slow and not as useful as
GE. As we show in Chapter 6, however, our modifications to the basic PSO
algorithm enable it to outperform GE. Our version of PSO does not require
a swarm of 100 particles to be effective, which would be slow as per Bhagoji
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et al.’s experience. Consequently, it can search for adversarial examples with
high success rates using swarms with as few as five (5) particles against image
classification models.
Ilyas et al. propose Natural Evolutionary Strategies (NES) to estimate
column-wise gradients to find adversarial examples [29]. The authors use pro-
jected gradient descent on the estimated gradients to craft adversarial exam-
ples. They also extend the approach in [30] to utilize the bandit optimization
method to exploit prior information when estimating the gradients. Specifi-
cally, they incorporate a data-dependent prior, which exploits the similarity
in gradient information exhibited by adjacent pixels. Furthermore, they also
incorporate a time-dependent prior that utilizes the high correlation between
gradients estimated in successive steps. Although the attack can generate
high-quality adversarial examples with few queries, the approach has been
shown to be quite sensitive to changes in hyperparameter values. Moon et
al. [52] have shown that having too many hyperparameters could lead to sig-
nificant variability in attack performance, creating dependability on the val-
ues chosen for those hyperparameters. Gradient-estimation based approaches
commonly have multiple hyperparameters that are necessary for the execution
of attacks such as the learning rate, search variance, decay rate, and update
rules – in a real-world black-box setting, tuning these hyperparameters would
either incur additional queries or might not be possible at all in many cases.
In our black-box attack on image classification models, there are only two hy-
perparameters and they have predictable effects on the outcome of the attack.
Gradient-Free Attacks: Moon et al. formulate the problem of crafting
adversarial examples as a set maximization problem that searches for the set of
positive and negative perturbations that maximizes an objective function [52].
Similar to [30], the authors exploit the spatial regularity exhibited by adja-
cent pixels by searching for perturbations in blocks instead of individual pixels.
They increase the granularity of the blocks as the search progresses. Our Ad-
versarialPSO attack searches for perturbations in blocks as well and yields
comparable results as Moon et al.’s approach. However, our approach is ca-
pable of adjusting hyperparameter values effectively for the trade-off between
L2 and queries as we show in Chapter 6.
Guo et al. explore a simple attack that crafts adversarial examples by ran-
domly sampling a set of orthonormal vectors and adding or subtracting them
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from the input [21]. The attack is shown to be successful in crafting adversarial
examples despite its simplicity. However, the success of the attack diminishes
as dimensionality increases, as shown when targeting InceptionV3, which ex-
pects inputs (299x299) with higher dimensionality than that of ResNet and
DenseNet (224x224). As the perturbations are applied randomly, many queries
are wasted by the approach until a solution is found.
By utilizing Differential Evolution (DE), Su et al. show that some test
samples can be misclassified by changing a single pixel [76]. Similar to the
PSO algorithm used in this paper, DE is a population-based algorithm that
maintains and manipulates a set of candidate solutions until an acceptable
outcome is found. The objective of this one-pixel attack is to better understand
the geometry of adversarial space and proximity of adversarial examples to
their corresponding inputs. The attack does not achieve high success rates
due to the tight constraints used in the study.
Another population-based black-box attack is GenAttack [2], which uses
Genetic Algorithm (GA) to find adversarial examples. This attack iteratively
performs the three genetic functions selection, crossover, and mutation, where
selection extracts the fittest candidates in a population, crossover produces
a child from two parents, and mutation encodes diversity to the population
by applying small random perturbations. The authors propose two heuristics
to reduce the number of queries used by GenAttack, namely dimensionality
reduction and adaptive parameter scaling. Although the authors propose two
heuristics to reduce the numbers of queries used by their approach, GenAttack
uses a higher number of queries compared to our approach.
Defenses
Multiple defenses against adversarial examples were proposed, which focuses
on either making the architecture more robust, detecting adversarial examples,
or including the adversarial examples in the training process. Papernot et
al. used distillation to make the model more robust to perturbations [63].
Distillation is traditionally used to transfer knowledge from a larger network
to a second smaller network. However, the authors of [63] used distillation
to reduce the number of network gradients that can be targeted by attackers,
thus making the model more robust to changes.
Another defense was proposed by Gu et al., where they increase model
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robustness by using Deep Contractive Networks (DCN) [19]. In essence, DCN
generalizes Contractive Autoencoders (CAE) to a feedforward neural network.
The purpose of DCNs is to minimize output variance with respect to the
input by incorporating layer-wise penalties and thus making the network more
robust.
To detect and defend against adversarial examples, Meng et al. introduced
MagNet [48]. MagNet uses two networks: a detector to detect adversarial ex-
amples and a reformer to reshape them back to the manifold of normal sam-
ples. This approach does not make modifications to the original architecture
but complements it with MagNet to detect and protect against adversarial
examples. To detect attacks, the authors use the reconstruction error of au-
toencoders, where the sample is considered adversarial if the reconstruction
error was high. Furthermore, if the reconstruction error was low, they would
utilize the probability divergence between the reconstruction error and the
target classifier’s softmax output to determine whether or not the sample is
adversarial.
To fortify their model against adversarial examples in the malware domain,
the authors of [27] generated attack samples and incorporated them in their
training process. They tested four different methods to generate adversarial
examples, which are then included in the training process using the saddle
point formulation presented in [46]. The malware features used by the authors
to evaluate this approach were statically extracted API calls from PE binaries.
2.2.3 Adversarial ML in the Malware Domain
Grosse et al. [18] utilized the saliency map attack introduced in [62] to generate
adversarial examples for the Android malware detection model DREBIN [4].
However, as JSMA was designed for the continuous feature-space of images,
the authors had to adapt the attack to the discrete feature-space of malware.
Similar to the original JSMA implementation, the authors use the model’s
gradient to determine which features would have the largest impact of the
model’s prediction. However, in contrast to applying JSMA on images, which
would add perturbations to pixel values, the attack on malware would simply
set the binary values representing the malware features to indicate the presence
of specific API calls that were originally absent from the malware. In other
words, the attack was restricted to adding features to the malware and not
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removing or replacing features. This restriction was enforced to maintain
the malware’s original functionality as removing features would have a more
drastic impact of how the malware behaves than adding features.
Another approach for generating adversarial malware examples was pro-
posed by Demontis et al. [13], where the authors also generate adversarial
examples to mislead DREBIN [4]. Five different attack scenarios were ad-
dressed in the study based on the attacker’s capabilities and knowledge of the
target. Specifically, the authors address a no-effort attack that performs no
transformations on the malware, a DexGaurd-based attack that uses the An-
droid obfuscation tool DexGaurd to transform malware, a mimicry attack in
which the attacker trains a surrogate classifier that approximates the target, a
limited-knowledge attack in which the attacker knows the learning algorithm
used by the target, and finally, a perfect-knowledge attack, which assumes
the attacker has internal knowledge of the target classifier. For the mimicry,
limited-knowledge, and perfect knowledge attacks, the authors utilize an op-
timization formula that maximizes the probability of evasion by modifying
features in the malware. The purpose of these scenarios is to evaluate a de-
fense proposed by the authors.
To generate adversarial malware examples in a black-box setting, Hu and
Tan use Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) in their attack called Mal-
GAN [24]. MalGAN uses a substitute model that approximates the target
and a generative network that minimizes malware predictions of the substi-
tute model. The model targeted in this paper uses API calls found in the code
to make predictions and similar to [18], the authors restrict modifications to
adding features to the malware. Adversarial examples are created by passing
both the feature-vector representing the malware and a randomly-generated
noise vector to the generator. The output of the generator indicates which ab-
sent API calls to inject in the malware code to produce misclassifications by
the substitute model. The attack depends on the transferability of adversarial
examples from the substitute model to the target black-box.
Similar to [24], Rosenberg et al. also use a surrogate Recurrent Neural Net-
work (RNN) and a GAN to generate adversarial examples from malicious API
call sequences [68]. Furthermore, their attack also depends on the trasferabil-
ity property of adversarial examples. The authors use the GAN to generate
benign no-op API calls which they then inject into the malware’s API call
sequence. No-op API calls are API calls that have no functional effect on the
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execution flow of the malware. Almost any API can be made into a no-op API
by passing certain arguments when the API is called. For example, passing
an invalid file handle to the API call OpenFile to open a non-existent file.
Another type of no-op API calls are those that merely queries for informa-
tion without modifying the sytsem, such as the GetSystemDirectoryA API
call, which returns the path of the system directory. The issue however, with
inserting such APIs in the malware call sequence is that they are easily de-
tectable. The malware can be scanned for APIs calls with invalid arguments
and unused return values. For that reason, we choose to pursue an attack
that replaces API calls with functionally equivalent API calls to create a more
powerful and robust attack.
Chapter 3
Malware Detection using API
Call Sequences
In this chapter, we discuss the details of training the malware detection model
we use as a target for the AdversarialPSO attack. The model is trained on
API call sequences made by both malware and benignware. At the time of
writing this dissertation, there were no publicly available API call datasets for
training ML models. Therefore, we generate our own dataset by executing the
samples in a sandbox environments and recording the API calls made by each
sample. We chose the dynamic-analysis route for data collection and mal-
ware detection for two reasons. First, we chose dynamic-analysis to avoid the
complexity and possible bias introduced by static-analysis evasion techniques
commonly used by malware developers. Although dynamic-analysis evasion is
still possible, they are often easier to recognize during the analysis process if
they were employed by a malware sample. We discuss later in the chapter our
steps to mitigate the effects of such evasion techniques. The vulnerability of
static-analysis to evasive measures has led many researchers to utilize dynamic
approaches for analyzing malware. The increased usage of dynamic-analysis
approaches in the literature is the second reason we chose this route for eval-
uating our replacement-based adversarial attack. Nonetheless, as we discuss
in Section 5.2.3, attacking static-based models using the same approach is
possible. Attacking static-based classifiers using our replacement attack is an
avenue we would like to explore in future work. In the following sections, we
discuss our process for data collection, pre-processing, and model training.
23
CHAPTER 3. MALWAREDETECTION USING API CALL SEQUENCES24
3.1 Data Collection
To elevate the quality of malware experiments, Rossow et al. proposed 19
guidelines to handle, describe, and analyze malware datasets [69]. These
guidelines are grouped into four categories: correctness, transparency, real-
ism, and safety. Each of these categories addresses a specific requirement
essential to the success of research projects in the malware domain. Namely,
the correctness category addresses the general health of a malware dataset to
alleviate bias towards certain types of software. For example, one such guide-
line is to remove benignware from the malware portion of the dataset to avoid
bias towards benign artifacts when training malware detection models. This
could also occur indirectly if malware samples limit their behavior to benign
activities due to the detection of an analysis environment, thus introducing
benign behavior into the malware dataset. The transparency category contain
guidelines that increase the repeatability and comprehensibility of the exper-
iments. An example of a transparency guideline is to include a description
of the analysis environment when reporting the results of a research project.
Guidelines in the realism category are intended to increase the applicability
of the proposed detection models in real-world scenarios by creating realistic
environments and by evaluating the experiments under real-world conditions.
For example, as malware commonly check for user interaction before execut-
ing, appropriate stimuli must be used in the experiments to ensure the proper
execution of the malware. The last of the four categories is safety, which is
concerned with the legal and ethical issues when conducting malware exper-
iments, and the possible harm that may be inflicted on others. We attempt
to follow these best practices when creating the dataset and analyzing the
samples.
In the dynamic-analysis malware literature, API call sequences are among
the most common artifacts used for malware detection [28, 35, 65]. To obtain
these artifacts, a sandbox environment is required to execute both malware
and benignware. Our sandbox was operated using Cuckoo Sandbox 1 and
consisted of two Windows 7 SP1 virtual machines hosted on a Ubuntu 16.04
system. The Ubuntu system itself was a virtual machine hosted on a Windows
10 bare-metal system. The Ubuntu VM served three purposes: 1) it acted as
a barrier between the Windows 7 VMs and the Windows 10 host, protecting
1https://www.cuckoosandbox.org/
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it from live malware; 2) it ran Cuckoo sandbox, which automates the behavior
analysis of software and records the API calls made by each sample; and 3)
it simulated an internet connection to the Windows 7 VMs to increase the
chance for successful malware execution. The internet was simulated using
INetSim 2, which responds with fake websites, executables, and files when a
sample requests any such resource, and it would also respond to many other
different services such as DNS requests. The two Windows 7 VMs were run
concurrently, each with a different sample and were allowed to run for four
minutes for each sample. Benign software requiring installation were allowed
to complete their installation process and then run for two additional minutes.
Each of the Windows 7 VMs was configured with 4 GB of RAM and 1 CPU
core. The Ubuntu system, on the other hand, had 16 GBs of RAM and 4 CPU
cores. For each executed sample, Cuckoo produces a report of the sample’s
behavior containing the API call sequence made by the sample. Furthermore,
using VirusTotal 3, we confirm the ground truth of each sample and the families
of the malware samples.
Within the analysis VMs, we install a collection of commonly used soft-
ware such as PDF readers, media players, browsers, text editors, spreadsheet
programs, and email clients. This is to ensure that if a malware attempts to
run a file with a certain extension, it would be able to do so through one of
these programs. We also disable User Account Control (UAC), which would
prompt the user before making any changes to the OS including running new
software. Furthermore, we disable the firewall to allow the Cuckoo server
to communicate freely with the analysis machines. Finally, we disable Win-
dows Defender to avoid malware being blocked and quarantined by the default
Windows anti-malware system.
We obtained the malware samples for this study from VirusShare 4. We
initially analyze 5000 malware samples containing Trojans, Worms, Viruses,
Backdoors, and Adwares. Some samples were not classified to a category due
to a disagreement between VirusTotal AVs, we retain them nonetheless as
they were still classified as malicious. Benign software were collected from
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obtained a total number of 3773 benign software samples from all software
categories (e.g., browsers, file sharing, compression, multimedia, and security).
After executing the malware in the sandbox, several samples terminated pre-
maturely due to anti-VM techniques or unmet environment conditions, such
as missing DLL files that are required for execution. We discard these samples
from the malware training set, leaving us with 3837 malware samples. The
total dataset size of both malware and benignware is 7610 samples, which we
split into a training set (80%), validation set (10%), and test set (10%).
For each sample submitted for analysis, Cuckoo Sandbox starts a pre-
configured VM, injects it with a sample, executes the sample, monitors its
behavior, stops the VM, and reverts it back to a clean state. Cuckoo monitors
the behavior of each sample by injecting a monitor into the initial process and
in all its child processes 6. The monitor places user-mode hooks that redirects
execution to a hook handler whenever APIs are called. The APIs are then
logged by the handler, which then returns execution to the hooked function.
3.2 Data Preprocessing
The next step is to preprocess the data for model training. The longest se-
quences in our dataset has over 1 million time-steps while the average sequence
being approximately 25 thousand time-steps. However, upon inspecting the
longer sequences, we found that many of the samples were repeatedly calling
the same APIs, creating long sequence with too much redundancy. Although
the repetition of API calls might have had a functional purpose for the sample
(i.e., APIs called in a loop until a condition is met), retaining them makes
the sequences too long, which would have an adverse effect on both train-
ing time and accuracy. This is shown by Raff et al. [66], where they explore
the training of static-based malware detection models on sequences that con-
tain up 2 million time-steps. In their study, they find that long sequences
pose unique challenges, including the amount of resources needed to train the
model. Therefore, we retain only three consecutive calls of the same API. In
doing so, the average length of API call sequences went down from 25 thousand
to 5000 time-steps and the longest sequence became 100 thousand time-steps.
After trimming the sequences to manageable lengths, we encode the API
6https://www.cuckoo-monitor.readthedocs.io/en/latest/index.html
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calls to a format usable by the learning algorithm. We use label encoding to
transform the text-based API calls to integers that represent their locations in
the vocabulary. Although one-hot encoding in generally recommended when
encoding categorical data, we tested both approaches and found label encoding
to perform better. As we will explain in Section 3.3, we use an embedding layer
in our deep learning architecture, which learns during the training process an
appropriate transformation from discrete data to continuous data. Using the
embedding layer with label encoding eliminated the need for one-hot encoding.
In addition to the evaluation of different encoding schemes, we also evaluate
the optimal sequence length for training the model. We empirically evaluate
different sequence lengths by training the model using variable sized inputs
and testing on the validation set. We evaluate lengths of 500, 1000, 2500,
5000, and 10000 time-steps to find that the model accuracy plateaus after
2500 time-steps. Thus, we choose to train the model on the first 2500 API
calls made by each sample. We discuss training the model in more detail in
the next section.
3.3 Model Training
As shown by Kolosnjaji et al. [37], combining convolutional and recurrent
layers improves the classification of API call sequences. Therefore, we combine
the two layers to create a 5-layer DL model for malware classification. Our
model consists of an embedding layer, 2 convolutional layers, a recurrent layer,
and a fully connected layer followed by a softmax output layer to provide the
class probabilities. We train the model using the binary cross-entropy loss and
an Adam optimizer. We also use dropout in between the two convolutional
layers to prevent overfitting. The full model can be seen in Figure 3.1.
For hyperparameter tuning, we use 5-fold cross validation. We tune the
input sequence length, the embedding vector length, the kernel size and num-
ber of filters for the convolution layers, the pool size for max pooling, and
the number of LSTM units in the recurrent layer. Table 3.1 shows the hyper-
parameter values we tested and the values we eventually use for training the
malware detection model.
The model achieved an accuracy of 88.20% on the test set with 91.45%
recall and 86.25% precision. The process of creating the malware detection
model can be seen in Figure 3.2.
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Figure 3.1: Malware Detection Deep Learning Model Architecture
Hyperparameter Values Tested Best Value
Input Sequence Length [500,1000,2500,5000,10000] 2500
Embedding Vector Length [10,100,300,1000,5000] 300
Kernel Size [2,3,4,5,6] 6
Pool Size [2,3,4,5,6] 5
Number of LSTM Units [10,50,100,200] 100
Table 3.1: Hyperparameter Tuning Results
CHAPTER 3. MALWAREDETECTION USING API CALL SEQUENCES29





To generate adversarial examples from both malware and images, we utilize
the population-based algorithm Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO). In this
chapter, we cover the fundamentals of PSO, which will be the foundation of
the AdversarialPSO attacks that will be discussed in later chapters. Also,
as the original PSO algorithm was designed to operate on continuous data,
and as malware is often represented by discrete data, we discuss the necessary
adaptations required to execute the attack on discrete data. Finally, to avoid
redundancy in later chapters, we include some common aspects shared between
the malware attack and the image classification attack.
4.1 Particle Swarm Optimization
Kennedy and Eberhart first proposed PSO as a model to simulate how flocks
of birds forage for food [33]. It has since been adapted to address a multitude
of problems, such as text feature selection [45], grid job scheduling [31], and
optimizing the generation of electricity [16]. The algorithm works by dispersing
particles in a search space and moving them until a solution is found. The
search space is assumed to be d-dimensional, where the position of each particle
i is a d-dimensional vector Xi = (xi,1, xi,2, xi,3, . . . , xi,d).
The position of each particle is updated according to a velocity vector Vi
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where Vi = (vi,1, vi,2, vi,3, . . . , vi,d). In each time-step or iteration, denoted as
t, the velocity vector is used to update the particle’s next position, calculated
as:
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) + vi(t+ 1) (4.1)
vi(t+ 1) = wvi(t) + c1R1(pg − xi(t)) + c2R2(pi − xi(t)) (4.2)
Equation 4.2 contains three terms. The first term controls how much influence
the current velocity has when calculating the next velocity and is constrained
with the inertia weight w. The second term, with weight c1, is referred to as
exploration, as it allows particles to explore further regions in the search space
in the direction of the best position found by the swarm, denoted by pg. The
third term, with weight c2, is referred to as exploitation, and it is based on the
best position found by this particle, denoted by pi.
R1 and R2 are d-dimensional vectors that contain uniformly distributed
random numbers which are calculated for each iteration to encode randomness
in the search process.
Early implementations of PSO assigned a fixed value to w. Shi and Eber-
hart, however, found that linearly decreasing inertia weight improved PSO
performance [74]. In each iteration, fixed values wstart and wend together with
a maximum number of iterations tmax were used to calculate w as following:






4.2 Continuous vs Discrete Targets
To compute the velocity for each particle, the PSO algorithm calculates the
distance between the particle’s current position Xi, and both its best individual
position pi and the best swarm position pg. For continuous data, calculating
these distances can be done directly using Equation 4.2. However, for discrete
data, Equation 4.2 cannot be used directly to move particles and must be
adapted to accommodate discrete search spaces.
The simplest way to adapt PSO to discrete and combinatoral problems is
to use PSO normally as if on continuous data and then round off the values to
the nearest valid point after each iteration [41]. However, as discussed in [32],
this approach has two drawbacks that make it less effective than other discrete
PSO approaches. First, by rounding continuous values to the nearest discrete
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point, the destination of particle movements could lie outside the boundaries
of the search space thus providing infeasible solutions. Furthermore, large dis-
crepancies in the fitness function could be observed before and after rounding
off the continuous numbers causing sub-optimal particle movements.
Another approach for solving discrete problems, called Binary PSO (BPSO),
is proposed by Kennedy and Eberhart [34]. This approach requires the po-
sition vectors to be represented by binary values where every dimension in
each candidate solution should contain either 0 or 1. The position vectors are
then used to calculate the velocity vector using Equation 4.2, which is then
transformed to a [0,1] interval using the sigmoid function. The outcome is a
probability vector where each index is the probability of the same index in the
position vector to take a value of 1, and where a low probability favors a value
of 0. An extension of this approach was proposed by Veeramachaneni et al.
to account for multi-valued discrete variables [82].
Pampara et al. proposed transforming high dimensional discrete search
spaces to smaller continuous search spaces using an angle modulation-based
method [59]. Similar to [34], this approach assumes binary values for each
element in the position vector. The benefit of the angle modulated approach
is that no modifications are required to the original PSO algorithm as the
search space transformation is sufficient to accommodate discrete values.
The approach we use for attacking the malware detection model is a com-
bination of the binary PSO approach proposed by Kennedy et al. [34] and
its multi-valued variant proposed by Veeramachaneni et al. [82]. We discuss
our attack further in Chapter 5. We also refer the readers to [32] for more
information about using PSO in a discrete domain.
4.3 AdversarialPSO Foundations
Among the many applications of PSO, we show in this dissertation that it can
also be used to craft adversarial examples for both images and malware. Shi
and Eberhart [74] found that PSO is quick to converge on a solution and scales
well to large dimensions, at the cost of slower convergence to global optima.
This would make PSO an excellent fit for finding adversarial examples in the
black-box setting, as it suggests that it can identify sufficiently good examples
with few queries.
In the following section, we describe the commonalities between our attack
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on malware detection models and our attack on image classification models.
4.3.1 Fitness Function
To adapt PSO to the problem of creating adversarial examples, we define a
fitness function that measures the change in model output when perturbations
are added to the input. In both targeted and untargeted attacks, the fitness
function measures how much the model’s confidence in the target label rises
or drops, respectively. When performing untargeted attacks, the fitness for
each candidate solution is the confidence drop in the original class predicted
by the model. Given the original image x, the perturbed image x′, the model
parameters θ, and the original label y we compute confidence f(x, y, θ). We
then calculate the fitness using fitness = f(x, y, θ) − f(x′, y, θ). In targeted
attacks, however, fitness is given by the increase in confidence in the desired
class. For the target label y′, we compute confidence f(x, y′, θ) and fitness =
f(x′, y′, θ)− f(x, y′, θ).
4.3.2 Calculating the Inertia Weight w
As shown in Equation 4.3, the inertia weight w is traditionally computed using
the current and maximum number of iterations. However, in the case of black-
box adversarial attacks, number of queries is a more appropriate measure for
how much the attack progressed. Therefore, we modify Equation 4.3 to com-
pute w with respect to the number of queries instead of number of iterations
as following:






where qmax is the query budget used in the attack and q is the number of
queries submitted to the model. We use 1 and 0 for wstart and wend, respec-
tively.
4.3.3 The Particle Explosion Problem
For long running attacks, the velocity would eventually become so large that
it would overpower the exploration and exploitation terms in Equation 4.2.
This would cause particles to get stuck at the edges of the search space as the
ever-increasing velocity would continuously push them to locations outside the
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valid boundaries of the search area. This is a well known problem in PSO and
although the inertia weight is meant to mitigate it, it does not completely
solve the problem. Therefore, in addition to the inertia weight, we perform
velocity clamping to limit the growth of the velocity vector. This is performed
at every iteration for each particle before applying the perturbation to the
particle positions, and is performed as follows:
vi(t) = clip(vi(t),−B,B) (4.5)
Where −B and B are the lower and upper bounds of the search space and are
specific to the model under attack.
4.3.4 PSO Algorithm
The overall algorithm for using PSO to generate adversarial examples is the
same for both malware detection and image classification. However, there are
some differences at the implementation level, which we will discuss further
in later chapters. For both attacks, the search for adversarial examples is
performed in two stages: initialization and optimization. The initialization
stage disperses the particles in the search space and tests the initial fitness
for the starting point of each particle. The optimization stage moves the
particles according to Equation 4.2 and tests the fitness for each new position
until either an adversarial example is found or the query budget is exhausted,
whichever comes first.
Initialization
For each input, the search process starts with initializing the particles by
randomizing their positions in the search space. Particles are initialized by
randomly perturbing an equal number of elements for each particle. In large
swarms, each particle is assigned fewer elements, resulting in a more fine-
grained search for adversarial examples. The overall algorithm for the initial-
ization stage can be seen in Algorithm 1. A more detailed description of how
the particles are initialized by each attack will be provided in each attack’s
respective chapters.
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Algorithm 1 Initializing the swarm
1: Input: input x, particle array par
2: bestF itness← 0 # swarm-wide best
3: bestPosition← x
4: divide search space among particles
5: for p in par do
6: p.position← x
7: p.bestF itness← bestF itness
8: p.bestPosition← bestposition
9: perturb p.position
10: fitness← calculateF itness #includes update to q
11: compare fitness against best particle fitness
12: compare :fitness against best swarm fitness
13: end for
14: return par, bestPosition, bestF itness
Optimization
The optimization step of AdversarialPSO (Algorithm 2) is an iterative process
that moves the particles in search of better fitness. Particle positions are
updated using the velocity vector, which is calculated for each particle in every
iteration. After moving the particles, their fitness is calculated and compared
against the particle’s best fitness to determine which particle position will
be used to calculate future particle movements. The particle’s fitness is also
compared against the best fitness achieved in the swarm as a whole (i.e, best
swarm fitness), and if the particle fitness was found to be better, the swarm
is updated to account for the position with the highest fitness. The process is
repeated until an adversarial example is found or when the process exhausts
the allowed number of queries.
Finally, we have adopted the mutation concept from genetic algorithms
to encode more randomness in particle movements [15]. Randomly mutating
particles helps avoid getting stuck in local minimas as there is always the
possibility of moving the particles. This however, is implemented differently
for both attacks so we leave their explanations to later chapters.
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Algorithm 2 Move Particles
1: Input: particle array par, swarm-wide best fitness bestF itness, and
swarm-wide best position bestPosition
2: for p in par do
3: v ← calculateV elocity
4: p.position← updatePosition
5: fitness← calculateF itness #includes update to q
6: p.currentF it← fitness
7: compare fitness against best particle fitness







In this chapter, we describe our PSO attack on API-based malware detection
models. Attacking models trained on software behavior requires that changes
made to the input do not disrupt the original function of the software. In
other words, the perturbations that fool the ML models must not introduce
any errors to the software code. To accommodate this constraint, related work
restrict their changes to adding features to the input [25,68]. In the case of API
calls, the inserted APIs must be no-ops, which are APIs that have no effect on
the execution flow of the software. Almost all APIs can be made into no-ops
by controlling their arguments, for example, opening a non-existing file by
passing an incorrect file handle. However, inserting such APIs into the input
sequence can be detected by analyzing the sample for irregular arguments
or by searching for return values that are not utilized later during software
execution. This weakness led us to RQ1, which explores alternative methods
of creating adversarial examples without relying solely on feature insertion.
To answer RQ1, we explore the possibility of an API replacement attack
that replaces API calls made by a malware with other functionally-equivalent
API calls. This is a more restrictive attack as not all API calls can be replaced.
Nonetheless, as all API calls in the sequences would have valid arguments and
their return values utilized at some point, as they would have been before
37
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replacement, the attack would be harder to detect. This chapter presents
our attack by first describing our method for finding functionally equivalent
API mappings and then discussing how our PSO-based attack utilizes those
mapping.
5.1 Finding Functionally-Equivalent API Calls
To perform the AdversarialPSO attack on API-based malware detection mod-
els, we first must find functionally equivalent API calls to replace the API
calls made by the malware. An obvious option for such functions is to use
the low-level API calls the are eventually called by the high-levels APIs. For
example, instead of using the WriteFile API call, we can use the NtWriteFile
or ZwWriteFile. Although we do use low-level functions as potential replace-
ments for their high-level counterparts, we conduct this study to find more
equivalencies.
To find functionally-equivalent API calls, which we will refer to henceforth
as mappings, we turn back to ML. In this dissertation, we focus on Windows
malware as that is most common type of malware found in the wild. We
therefore use the documentation provided by the Microsoft Developer Network
(MSDN)1 as a corpus for our ML techniques. MSDN documentation contains
descriptions for most API calls supported by Windows 7. Using a web crawler,
we were able to obtain the documentation for 867 API calls.
To facilitate code migration, researchers in the software engineering domain
have explored methods to automate the process of finding function mappings
between different platforms. For example. Gu et al. present DeepAM [20], a
method that utilizes Seq2Seq, which is a ML technique that transforms one se-
quence to another, to find API mappings between Java and .Net. Another ex-
ample is the work done by Bui and Jiang [10] that aims to learn cross-language
representation to translate source code from one language to another. In their
work, they translate code between Java and C# using Word2Vec, a neural
network approach for creating word embeddings. This concept is further ex-
plored by Bui where the author aims to find mappings without depending on
labeled datasets [9], unlike previous work which required some equivalent APIs
between the platforms to be identified. The author uses unsupervised domain
1https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/apiindex/windows-api-list
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adaption via GANs to find the parallel APIs.
In finding equivalent mappings, our problem differs from that of related
work. First, to the best of our knowledge, all related work that aims to find
equivalent functions have access to both the functions’ source code and docu-
mentation. In our problem however, we have partial access to documentation
and we only have access to the functions’ compiled code, but not their source
code. The reason we have partial access to documentation is that many of the
functions in our dataset consist of native low-level functions that are not made
public by Windows. As for the functions’ code, we access them through Dy-
namic Link Libraries (DLL)s. DLLs are compiled binaries and disassembling
them provides assembly code, which is more complex and less informative
than high-level source code. Another difference in our work is that while re-
lated work map functions across different platforms, we search for function
mappings within the same platform.
We use unsupervised learning methods to find function mappings. Specif-
ically, we use a combination of K-means, Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA),
and Doc2Vec. Before we describe our approach for finding function mappings,
we first provide some background on the unsupervised methods we use.
5.1.1 Background
In the following sections, we provide a brief overview on K-means, LDA, and
Doc2Vec:
K-Means
K-means is an unsupervised learning approach that divides samples X into
k disjoint clusters C [44]. Each cluster is described by the mean µj of all
the samples within the cluster, also known as the centroid. The clustering
algorithm has three steps:
1. Randomly choose k centroids, where k is a hyperparameter that is spec-
ified beforehand.
2. Repeat
(a) Assign samples to the nearest centroid.
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(b) Update the centroids by calculating the mean of all samples they
were assigned.
The process is repeated until the centroids no longer change or the changes
are smaller than a certain threshold. The objective is to minimize the within-





(‖xi − µj‖2) (5.1)
Another way to evaluate the quality of the clusters is using the Silhouette
Score, which measures the cohesion and separation of the clusters [70]. Co-
hesion measures how similar samples are to samples of the same cluster and
separation measures how similar they are to samples of other clusters. The
range of the Silhouette Score is between -1 and 1, where higher numbers indi-
cate better fits.
The inertia measure is used in the Elbow Method to determine the best
k for K-means. This is determined by plotting the inertia for each k and
observing the point where it starts to diminish. This will create an elbow -like
shape indicating where the best k would be. Both the Silhouette Score and
Elbow Method are used in conjunction to select the best k for K-means.
LDA
LDA is a generative topic modelling algorithm that provides an explicit repre-
sentation of a document by generating a finite mixture of topic probabilities [8].
Topic modelling is the task of finding the best topics that describe a set of
documents. Essentially, the LDA algorithm considers each document as a col-
lection of latent topics and individual words in the document as attributing
to one of the topics. In other words, a document is assigned a set of topics
based on the words in the document.
The LDA training process computes the latent variables θ, ζ and ϕ, where
θ is the topic-document distribution, ζ is the set of topics, and ϕ is the
word-topic distribution. It does so by using an alternating Expectation-
Maximization (EM) procedure that empirically estimates the parameters. The
Expectation step performs inference on a collection of documents (in this case,
function documentation), and the maximization step accumulates the newly
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acquired statistics from the E-step and updates the model. To infer top-
ics from function documentation, we use the online variational Bayes (VB)
method proposed by Hoffman et al. in [23] and implemented in the Gensim
library2.
Doc2Vec
To learn fixed-sized representations of variable-sized texts, Le and Mikolov [42]
propose the unsupervised learning approach Paragraph Vector, also known as
Doc2Vec. Doc2Vec extends Word2Vec to generate numerical representations
for sentences or paragraph. Word2Vec, also known as word embedding, learns
word representations by examining the context surrounding the word. The
goal is to place words with similar context near each other in vector space.
Both Word2Vec and Doc2Vec train neural networks to produce vector repre-
sentations of the input.
5.1.2 Function Features
To find function mappings, we use 6 types of features extracted from both the
documentation and code. We use a web scraper on https://docs.microsoft.
com and https://msdn.microsoft.com to extract the following:
• Short description: One or two sentences that describe the API call’s
functionality. Often found at the top of the documentation page.
• Input parameters: Includes the type and name of each parameter used
by the API call, whether the parameter is optional or required, and a
short description for each parameter.
• Return type: The type of value returned by the function
• Required Libraries: The libraries required for the function to run
• Remarks: Additional information on the functionality and usage of the
API call.
We also extract the functions’ assembly code from a list of DLLs we compiled
from the required libraries field. We disassemble the DLLs using IDA Pro and
2https://radimrehurek.com/gensim/models/ldamodel.html
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extract the assembly code for each function in our API list. However, not all
API calls had code as some functions were simply wrappers for others. The
process of extracting function data is depicted in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1: Overall Process for extracting API call data for finding function
mappings
5.1.3 Unsupervised Learning for Finding Function Mappings
As discussed in the beginning of this chapter, generating adversarial examples
from malware samples could be done by either inserting API calls into the
malware’s function call sequence, or by replacing the calls made by the malware
with functionally-equivalent API calls. For the insertion method to retain
the malwares’ original functionality, the functions inserted must not alter the
malwares’ execution flow. Therefore, the API calls being inserted are limited
to no-ops, which are calls that have no effect on the underlying system or the
runtime software state. Such calls can be detected by scanning the malware
samples for function calls with irregular arguments or unutilized return values.
This weakness could be avoided by replacing the function calls with other
functionally-equivalent calls, the method we propose in this dissertation.
To find function mappings, we use a hierarchical approach consisting of
the three unsupervised learning techniques, K-means, LDA, and Doc2Vec. We
apply these methods on the function documentation to find other functions
with similar functionality. We also use the Doc2Vec approach on the functions’
disassmebled code for further validation of equivalency. To verify our results,
we manually replace a function calls from a subset of malware samples and
execute those samples in a sandbox. We confirm that after replacing the calls,
the malware samples still run as intended.
Essentially, our method for finding function mappings combines results
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from the three aforementioned unsupervised learning techniques. If two func-
tions reside within the same K-means cluster, share the same or several LDA
topics, and have high cosine similarity between their Doc2Vec vector represen-
tations, we then consider them as candidates function mappings. As a final
verification, we manually inspect those mappings to ensure that functionality
is maintained.
All three methods are applied on the documentation corpus, but only
Doc2Vec was used on the code. The reason is, extracting topics using LDA
from assembly instructions could prove difficult due to the small vocabulary
size of the code. Similarly, using K-means to divide samples into clusters
based on disassmbled code would be ineffective for the same reason. However,
we were able to quantify assembly code with Doc2Vec using long embedding
vectors (100).
In the following section, we discuss our approach for finding function map-
pings:
K-means
To vectorize the terms in the corpus, we use Word2Vec on the 200 most
salient terms in each document. We first preprocess the text by stemming
all the terms and removing stop-words such as ’the’, ’a’, and ’in’. We then
use Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) to select the 200
most prominent terms in each document. TF-IDF counts the number of times
a term appears in a document, and then weights the importance of that term
by counting its occurrence in other documents. A term that appears in many
documents is less important than a term that appears in fewer documents.
We consider uni-grams, bi-grams, and tri-grams when calculating the TF-IDF
scores so that context is included in the calculations.
After selecting the top 200 grams, we train a Word2Vec model and use it to
vectorize the corpus. The word embeddings generated by Word2Vec is used to
train the K-means model. We empirically test multiple values of k (5-20) with
different variations of documentation data. As shown in Figures 5.2 and 5.3,
based on the Elbow Method and Silhouette Scores, 7 is the optimal number
of clusters to use in K-means.
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Figure 5.2: Elbow Method for determine best k for K-means
LDA
The second unsupervised method we use is LDA. First, we preprocess the data
as we did in K-means by removing stop-words and by stemming all the terms in
the corpus. We then tokenize the documents using Bag-of-Words (BOW) and
train the LDA model. To evaluate the quality of topics, we use the Coherence
Score, namely, the UMass measure. The UMass Coherence Score is measured
as following:
SCOREUMass(wi, wj) = log
D(wi, wj) + 1
D(wi)
(5.2)
Where D(wi, wj) is the number of documents words wi and wj appear together
and wi measure the number of documents wi appears alone. According to the
UMass measure, if two words belong to the same topic, then it make sense
that they appear frequently together and would thus achieve higher scores.





Using the Coherence Score, we selected the best number of topics to generate
by re-training LDA to generate variable number of topics. As shown in Fig-
ure 5.4, 10 topics achieved the best Coherence Score (closer to 0 is better).
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Figure 5.3: Silhouette Scores for different k’s for K-means
Once the model is trained with the optimal number of topics, we extract
the topics that represent each function’s documentation.
Doc2Vec
The third and final unsupervised method we use is Doc2Vec. We use Doc2Vec
to determine how similar two functions are according to both their descriptions
and code. To do so, for the descriptions, we preprocess the corpus as we did
with K-means and LDA. For the code however, no preprocessing was used as
the data does not conform to natural language rules.
To extract the code for each function, we first retrieve the DLLs listed in
the Required Libraries field. For most of the DLLs, a copy was found in the
System folder of a fresh Windows 7 installation. We extract the code as is
by including both operations and their operands. If jump instructions were
present within the function scope and if the jumps lead to locations within
the same DLLs, we would follow the jump instructions and extract the code
at the jump destination.
We train two Doc2Vec models, one for function documentation and the
other for function code. For both models, we use embedding vectors that are
100 dimensions long and we train them for 100 epochs each. We then use the
models to generate embeddings for each function’s documentation and code.
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Figure 5.4: UMass Coherence Score for LDA
Finally, we use cosine similarity to measure the similarity between functions
based on the embeddings generated by the Doc2Vec models.
Combining Results
We use the results of all three methods to find function mappings. For each
function, we iterate through all other functions within the same K-means
cluster and compare the LDA topics for each two pairs. If the functions share 3
or more topics, we compare their Doc2Vec embeddings using cosine similarity.
We use 0.6 as a threshold for both code and documentation to determine if
two API calls are similar. Any two functions that meet the aforementioned
criteria are evaluated further by manually inspecting their documentation and
code to confirm their equivalency. Furthermore, for a subset of the mappings,
we perform the replacements in a malware sample and execute it in a sandbox.
We confirm that the malware still runs even after replacing the functions.
Of the 867 API calls considered in this study, we found mappings for 359
functions. For some APIs, multiple mappings were found. Table 5.1 shows a
few examples of functionally equivalent API calls.
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Table 5.1: Examples for functionally equivalent API calls
5.2 AdversarialPSO for Malware Detection Models
The mappings we generate in Section 5.1 create the search space for our Ad-
versarialPSO attack. However, as discussed in Section 4.2, PSO cannot be
directly applied on discrete data and must be adapted for particle movements.
Although there are several approaches for using PSO on discrete data, we use
an algorithm that works for the mappings we generated. In the next section,
we discuss the implementation details for our AdversarialPSO attack that
generates adversarial examples from malware.
5.2.1 Crafting Adversarial Malware using PSO
PSO variants that operate on discrete data assume either binary or fixed-
sized features. In other words, particle positions are represented by an dxm
matrix where d is the number of dimensions in the search space and m is the
number of possible values for each dimension. In the case of API replacement
however, the number of available mappings are different from one API to
another. Therefore, m is different for each dimension, creating an irregular
or jagged matrix. Furthermore, the shape of the matrix would be different
from one malware sample to another as API calls would appear in different
locations.
The approach we use is based on the binary PSO implementation proposed
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by Kennedy et al. [34], which is extended by Veeramachaneni et al. to account
for multi-valued discrete variables [82]. In this approach, the velocity vector




. For each dimension, a random number is generated
using a uniform distribution and is then compared against the normalized ve-
locity to decide if the value in that position should be 0 or 1. Veermanachaneni
et al. extend this approach by assuming discrete values between [0,m-1] and
by normalizing the velocity using Sid =
m
1+e−Vid
, which calculates a probability
for each potential value in every element. Our approach combines both binary
and multi-valued methods depending on the number of mappings that exist
for an API.
With the above adjustments for discrete search spaces, the AdversarialPSO
attack presented in Section 4.3.4 becomes as following:
Initialization
As previously mentioned, the search process starts with initializing the parti-
cles by randomizing their positions in the search space. Particles are initialized
by randomly perturbing an equal number of elements for each particle. For
the malware attack, this is performed by first indexing all the API calls with
available mappings and dividing those calls among the particles. Each particle
would then probabilistically decide which elements to perturb. Essentially, for
each particle, we create a d-length zero vector and assign a random number
between [0,1] to each element in the particle’s individual search space. This
d-length vector is considered to be the particle’s initial velocity. The elements
are perturbed according to the initial velocity by randomly choosing one of the
available mappings. In large swarms, each particle is assigned fewer elements,
resulting in a more fine-grained search for adversarial examples. The malware-
specific algorithm for the initialization stage can be seen in Algorithm 3.
Optimization
The optimization step for the malware AdversarialPSO attack uses the same
high-level operations shown in Section 4.3.4. However, as the attack operates
in discrete space, there are extra steps for velocity calculations and particle
movements. The velocity is calculated for each particle i in every iteration
t, and is computed based on particle’s best position pi and the swarm’s best
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Algorithm 3 Initializing the swarm for malware detection models
1: Input: input x, particle array par
2: bestF itness← 0 # swarm-wide best
3: bestPosition← x
4: searchSpace← indices of APIs with mappings
5: n← int(length(searchSpace)/P ) # elements per particle
6: for p in par do
7: p.velocity ← [0] ∗ length(x)
8: elements← select random n elements from searchSpace
9: remove elements from searchSpace
10: p.position← x
11: for element in elements do
12: if p.velocity[element] > random number then
13: perturb p.position[element] #select random mapping
14: end if
15: end for
16: fitness← calculateF itness #includes update to q
17: p.bestF it← fitness
18: p.currentF it← fitness
19: push (p.bestfit, p.position) to p.pastPosition
20: p.bestPos← p.position
21: if p.bestF it > bestF itness then




26: return par, bestPosition, bestF itness
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position pg. For each particle, we compare the particle’s current position xi
against pi and pg to determine how to move the particle. For continuous data,
we calculate the velocity using Equation 4.2, which directly subtracts xi from
pi and pg. For discrete data however, as subtracting is not possible, we rely
on logical operators to compare the positions.
When calculating the velocity for a particle, we use an indicator vector to
represent each element in xi, pi, and pg. This length of this vector is equal to
the number of potential API calls for that element. For example, if the nth
element in xi is a WriteFile call, and WriteFile has two potential mappings,
then the nth element in xi would be represented as [1,0,0], where 1 indicates
which of the three calls is currently in the sequence. To compare xi against pi
and pg, for each element n in xi. we perform the following:
vni (t+ 1) = wv
n
i (t) + c1R1((¬xni ) ∧ png ) + c2R2((¬xni ) ∧ pni ) (5.4)
Where ¬ is the logical not operator and ∧ is the logical AND operator. Using
the above Equation, multiple mappings could have a chance to be picked. If
the same weights were used in C1 and C2, the two random numbers r1 and
r2 would in this case control the odds for which mapping is chosen (the one
used by pg or the one used by pi). However, C1 or C2 could be used to favor
swarm best over particle best, or vice versa. Finally, the mapping with the
highest probability is compared against a random number and if it was found
to be larger, the particle replaces its current API with that mapping.
As explained in Chapter 4, we implement a random mutation operation to
help avoid getting stuck in local minimas. This is implemented by specifying a
small probability (0.1) that a particle randomly changes some of the mappings.
5.2.2 Evaluation
To evaluate the attack, we use the model we describe in Chapter 3. As the
field of dynamic-based malware detection suffers from a lack of benchmarks
and publicly available work, we resort to creating our own benchmark for eval-
uation. Also, at the time of writing, related work was limited to approaches
that only add to the malware call sequences. These approaches are vulnera-
ble to detection using non-ML techniques. Our work however, replaces API
calls with other functionally-equivalent APIs. Due to the limited number of
available mappings, this attack is launched under more restrictive constraints
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Algorithm 4 Optimization step for the malware AdversarialPSO attack
1: Input: particle array par, swarm-wide best fitness bestF itness, mutation
probability m and swarm-wide best position bestPosition
2: for p in par do
3: if m > random number then
4: for element in p.position do
5: perturb p.position[element] #select random mapping
6: end for
7: end if
8: for element in p.position do
9: if mapping for element exists then
10: calculate velocity for element # Eq. 5.4





16: fitness← calculateF itness #includes update to q
17: p.currentF it← fitness
18: if fitness > p.bestF itness then
19: p.bestF it← fitness
20: p.bestPos← p.position
21: end if
22: if p.bestF it > bestF itness then
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and is bound by the mappings available to the attack. Therefore, comparing
the two types of attacks would not be indicative of how the replacement-based
attack performs in comparison to the other attacks.
To evaluate the black-box attack, we use the same mappings to launch
a white-box gradient-based attack. The goal of using the white-box attack
as a baseline is twofold: first, it provides means to evaluate the black-box
aspect of the attack by comparing it to a white-box attack that shares the
same constraints, and second, it provides insight on which future direction to
pursue to enhance the attack. Before reporting the results of AdversarialPSO,
we will first describe the white-box gradient-based attack we use as a baseline.
We will then discuss our evaluation of the AdversarialPSO attack and provide
some possible avenues for future work.
Gradient-based White-box Attack
The gradient-based white-box attack we launch is an extension to the work
done by Grosse et al. in [18], which is based on the JSMA attack proposed
by Papernot et al. [62]. Essentially, the attack computes the gradient of the
loss function with respect to the input and makes changes that maximizes the












Where F is the neural network, X is the input, i is the class label (0 for benign
and 1 for malicious), and j is the feature in input X.
In their attack, Grosse et al. search for perturbations in X that maximizes
the classification of the input as benign. However, they only search for positive
changes (flipping 0 to 1) to maintain malware functionality. In our attack
however, we search for changes that maximize the classification to benign
through available API mappings. To do so, as some API calls have multiple
mappings, we first compute the gradient for all available alternative APIs and
then replace features in the input with the mappings that maximize the loss
with respect to the input.
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Results
We perform the evaluation using 183 correctly classified malware samples from
the test set. The model we attack achieved an accuracy of 88.20% on the test
set with 91.45% recall and 86.25% precision. On the 183 malware samples,
the model is 99.36% confident in its predictions on average. The model was
trained on the first 2500 API calls made a sample while retaining at most 3
consecutive calls of the same API in case of duplication. In the malware test
set, of the 2500 API calls used by the model, we had on average 553.69 APIs
with available mappings with an average of 1.46 mappings per API. Essentially,
the majority of the API calls had only 1 mapping, however, some API calls
had more (e.g. MapViewOfFile could be replaced with MapViewOfFileEx or
MapViewOfFileExNuma).
Interesting, as shown in Table 5.2, the AdversarialPSO black-box attack
outperformed the white-box attack. This could be attributed to the suscepti-
bility of gradient-based attacks to getting stuck in local minimas. PSO how-
ever, does not suffer from this due to the mutation operation which randomizes
particle positions. The AdversarialPSO attack created 51 adversarial exam-
ples from the test set of 183 malware, achieving a 27.86% successful rate..
The gradient-based attack on the other hand, created adversarial examples
for 13.66% of the test set (25 samples). However, when it did succeed, the
gradient-based attack would find the adversarial example much faster than the
AdversarialPSO attack. That is because is it guided by the gradient and is
able to find the solution after only a few steps. The average iterations for the
black-box attack was 358, which amounts to an average of 2688 queries made
to the model. The white-box attack on the other hand, finds the adversarial
examples within the first 5 iterations (when the gradient for all the mappings
are computed and compared), where on average, a solution is found in 1.36
iterations. Although number of queries are not significant in white-box attacks
(because attacks are assumed to have access to the model), on average, the
white-box attack queried the model 5.08 times. Each time the attack com-
putes the model gradient as shown in Equation 5.5, it counts as a single query.
Also, when the attack classifies the sample to check if the label changed after
perturbing the inputs, that also counts as a single query.
As both attacks were only able to generate adversarial examples for a small
subset of the malware, this is a strong indication that the mappings set an
upper-bound on how well the attacks can perform. Nonetheless, the ability
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Attack Success Rate Average Queries Average Iterations
AdversarialPSO 27.86% 2688 358
Gradient-based attack 13.66% 5.08 1.36
Table 5.2: Comparing black-box PSO-based attack against white-box
gradient-based attacks
of AdversarialPSO to create more adversarial examples as the gradient-based
attack while using the same constraints, demonstrates its ability to succeed
in more restrictive setting where particles are limited in movements. To fur-
ther evaluate its abilities, we test the attack on the image classification domain
where such limitations do not exist. As we show in Chapter 6, AdversarialPSO




As shown by the results in Section 5.2.2 and as we will shown in the next chap-
ter, PSO is able to generate adversarial examples in a black-box setting. The
attack on the malware detection model using replacement does generate fewer
adversarial examples than attacks that insert features, however, replacing API
calls is more robust against non-ML detection techniques than inserting null
APIs. Also, the approach we use in this dissertation focused on finding 1-to-1
mappings, which produced a rather limited set of possible API substitutions.
This could be extended by searching for 1-to-n, n-to-1, and n-to-n mappings.
Essentially, any augmentation to the set of all possible changes would allow
the particles to move more freely in the search space, which would in turn in-
crease the chances of finding adversarial inputs. Finding more API mappings
is possible direction for future work to enhance the API-replacement attack.
Attacking Static-based Malware Detection Models
The attack we present in this dissertation targets ML models that classify
software as malicious or benign based on their behavior. Specifically, it tar-
gets models that use API call sequences that are recorded during software
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execution. Another approach for malware detection is to train ML models on
static-based features such as the opcode sequences found in the binaries [72]
or their byte representations [66]. Similar to API calls, opcode instructions
could be mapped to functionally-equivalent sequences that perform the same
operations. In fact, this concept has been exploited by metamorphic engines
for quite some time to evade signature-based detection. The perform these
mutations by reordering instructions, replacing instructions, and renaming
variables. As the goal of these metamorphic engines is to evade signature-
based detection, they are largely ineffective against ML approaches that learn
patterns for classification. However, the attack we propose in this dissertation
could be adapted to operate on static-based features, the same ones used by
metamorphic engines, to create adversarial examples that evades the detec-
tion of ML models. This would essentially be creating the next generation
of metamorphic engines that use intelligence to fight intelligence. This is an





In this chapter, we describe how we use PSO to generate adversarial examples
for image classification models. The work we describe in this chapter aims
to answer our second research question RQ2, which explores the possibility
of re-adapting the AdversarialPSO attack to work in the image classification
domain. Evaluating the attack in a different domain with different constraints
would provide insight on the limits of the attack. If AdversarialPSO had
low success rates against images while sharing the same constraints as other
attacks in this area, this would show that the attack itself is weak, on top
of the possible limitation introduced by the limited API mappings. However,
if the attack performed well against image classification models, that would
prove that AdversarialPSO is able to effectively generate adversarial examples
but was limited by the amount of available mappings in the replacement-based
malware attack.
To compare our work against baselines in the image classification domain,
we adhere to the constraints of the field, which differ from the constraints
used when attacking malware detection models. Specifically, when attack-
ing images, the amount of perturbations added to the inputs are bound by a
pre-defined L∞ limit that must be maintained for a fair comparison with the
related work. L∞ measures the maximum change to any of the coordinates,
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where L∞ = max(|x1−x′1|, |x2−x′2|, . . . , |xd−x′d|). This ensures that pertur-
bations are not too large that the semantic properties of the images are lost.
For each of the benchmark datasets we consider in this work, we use the same
L∞ used in the baseline. To control the perturbations added to the input
image, we define an upper bound value B of maximum change to limit the L∞
distance between the adversarial image and the original image. Essentially, we
use the clip operator such that x
′
= clip(xi + vi, xi−B, xi +B). Additionally,
we also apply box constraints to maintain valid image values when adding
perturbations. These constraints are applied to Equation 4.1 to yield:
xi(t+ 1) = clip(clip(xi(t) + vi(t+ 1), xi −B, xi +B), 0, 1) (6.1)
6.1 Operations Specific to Image Classification
Although the overall process for generating adversarial examples is similar
for both malware and images, we implement additional operations specific to
images to enhance the efficacy of the attack.
6.1.1 Block-Based Perturbation
Similar to related work [52] [29] [6], we exploit the spatial regularity of adjacent
pixels by splitting the input into blocks and perturbing all the pixels in each
block en masse.
6.1.2 Following the Edge of the L∞ Ball
As observed by Moon et al. in [52], the optimal solution when crafting ad-
versarial examples often reside at the edges of the L∞ ball. Based on this
observation, when initializing and randomizing particles, we set their posi-
tions at the edge of the L∞ ball to observe the highest (or lowest) fitness for
each dimension. Particles are then moved inwards using Equations 4.2 and 6.1.
Moving inwards from the edge ensures that particles get enough velocity to
reach the other end quickly if the opposite position was found to have better
fitness. Otherwise, particles would waste queries moving around the center of
the ball until they eventually build enough velocity towards the position with
the highest fitness.
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6.1.3 Redundancy Minimization
Since we seek to minimize the number of queries, it is helpful to avoid re-
dundantly attempting the same modifications to the image across multiple
particles. Instead, we can leverage exploration in the PSO algorithm to ben-
efit from the best position in the swarm when such a modification is found to
be useful. We thus propose a novel method to minimize unnecessary queries
from redundant checks on already perturbed blocks. Essentially, if one of the
particles has modified one of the blocks in a given way, e.g. it increased the red
channel on all pixels in that block, then we prevent other particles from mak-
ing the same modification. To do this, we first define a set β with all available
blocks (which are still eligible to be modified), β = (b1, b2, b3, . . . , bn).
Then, for each block in the set, we create a list of all possible directions
containing the positive and negative directions for each channel in the block.
For grayscale images, which contain only a single channel, the list of possible
channel directions cd is given by cd = {(1), (−1)}. For RGB images, it is
cd = {(1, 0, 0), (−1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0,−1, 0), (0, 0, 1), (0, 0,−1)}.
In other words, any single channel could be increased or decreased. When a
direction in a block is assigned to a particle, that direction is then removed
from the list to avoid multiple particles perturbing the same block in the same
direction. When all the directions in a block are assigned to particles, we
remove that block from the set β. When there are no more blocks in the set,
we increase the granularity of the blocks by dividing the block-size by half and
recreate the block set to contain the smaller blocks.
Each particle maintains a list of all the blocks and directions assigned to
it. This list is used to avoid assigning an opposite direction to the particle
which would cancel out a direction that it was previously assigned.
With these modifications in place, the AdversarialPSO attack on image
classification model becomes as following:
6.1.4 Initialization
Particles are initialized by randomly assigning an equal number of blocks to
each particle. Two hyperparameters control how the swarm is initialized:
the number of particles in the swarm P and the initial block-size b, which
determines the number of initial blocks created and the number of blocks
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assigned to each particle. Each particle begins with the input image x and
the set of blocks β with a single direction for each block. Particles are then
dispersed in the search space by perturbing all the blocks assigned to them to
the edge of the L∞ ball according to the directions they were given. Once the
particles are created and dispersed, their fitness is calculated and subsequently
used in the optimization step.
Changes to the initialization process can be seen in Algorithm 5.
6.1.5 Randomization
In every iteration, in addition to particle movements, each particle is assigned
the next set of blocks and directions as was done in the initialization stage.
This randomization is performed after the particles are moved according to
their calculated velocity vectors to allow the exploration of additional regions
of the search space. This randomization process is performed until all the
directions in all the blocks are assigned to a particle, at which point, the gran-
ularity of the blocks are increased, and the particles are re-initialized with the
swarm best position as a starting point. Re-initializing the particles resets
their best positions, which would otherwise cause them to retract to the pre-
vious granularity in the next iteration. The algorithm for the randomization
process can be seen in Algorithm 6.
6.1.6 Reversal
After all the blocks are assigned to particles, a reversal of all the movements
that have caused a negative impact on the fitness is performed. This is done
before increasing the granularity of the blocks. The reversal is performed on
the swarm best position by iterating through the past positions of each par-
ticle and applying an opposite step for any movement that caused a negative
fitness for the particle. Moon et al. perform a similar operation by alter-
nating between adding perturbations and removing perturbations [52]. Their
reasoning however is due to submodularity, which refers to the diminishing
return affect that occurs when the set of all perturbations increase in size. In
our implementation however, instead of removing the perturbation from the
swarm best position, we perturb in the opposite direction with the idea that if
a direction decreased fitness, the opposite direction would increase it. We find
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Algorithm 5 Initializing the swarm
1: Input: input image x, particle array par, block-set B, and maximum
change m.
2: bestF itness← 0 # swarm-wide best
3: bestPosition← x
4: n← int(length(B)/P ) # blocks per particle
5: for p in par do
6: blocks← select random n elements fromB
7: p.position← x
8: for block in blocks do
9: push block to p.blockList
10: direction← select random direction fromB[block]
11: pop direction from B[block]
12: push direction to p.blockList[block]
13: for i in block do
14: p.positioni ← p.positioni +m ∗ direction
15: end for
16: end for
17: fitness← calculateF itness #includes update to q
18: p.bestF it← fitness
19: p.currentF it← fitness
20: push (p.bestfit, p.position) to p.pastPosition
21: p.bestPos← p.position
22: if p.bestF it > bestF itness then




27: return par, bestPosition, bestF itness
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Algorithm 6 Randomize Particles
1: Input: particle list par, block-set B, change rate cr, and maximum change
m.
2: for p in par do
3: if B is not empty then
4: blocks← select random cr elements fromB
5: for block in blocks do
6: if block in p.blockList then
7: d← p.blockList[block]
8: direction←select random direction fromB[block]− {d,−d}
9: pop direction from B[block]
10: push direction to p.blockList[block]
11: for i in block do
12: p.positioni ← p.positioni +m ∗ direction
13: end for
14: else
15: push block to p.blockList
16: direction← select random direction fromB[block]
17: pop direction from B[block]
18: push direction to p.blockList[block]
19: for i in block do




24: Compare new fitness against particle best and swarm best
25: end if
26: end for
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that in many instances that is, in fact, the case and a better position is often
found. The algorithm for the reversal operation can be seen in Algorithm 7
Algorithm 7 Reverse movements with negative fitness
1: Input: best position bestPosition and Particle list par
2: for p in par do
3: for pastPosition in p.pastPosition do
4: if pastPosition.fitness < 0 then
5: bestPosition← bestPosition− pastPosition.position
6: if Fitness did not improve then
7: Undo last changes
8: end if





The overall algorithm for generating adversarial examples from images can
be seen in Algorithm 8.
6.2 Evaluation
6.2.1 Setup
To evaluate AdversarialPSO, we consider the the success rate (i.e., the ratio of
successfully generated adversarial examples over the total number of samples)
and the average number of queries needed to generate adversarial examples.
We compare our results against the Parsimonious Black-Box Adversarial At-
tack [52], NES [29] and Bandits [30] using the benchmark dataset Imagenet.
Similar to the related work, we evaluate the attack using InceptionV3. The
Imagenet results for both untargeted and targeted attacks are obtained from
running AdversarialPSO on 1,000 correctly classified samples from the indices
list provided in the Parsimonious attack. The same target labels used in [52]
and [30] are used for the targeted experiment. The results for the untar-
geted and targeted Imagenet attacks are reported in Sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.4,
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Algorithm 8 Optimization
1: Input: maximum queries qmax,block-set B
2: while q < qmax do














We compare the AdversatialPSO attack on MNIST and CIFAR-10 against
the approach used by Bhagoji et al. [6] to show the improvements attained
from our modifications to the PSO algorithm. Similar to the models used in [6],
we use ResNet-32 and a 2 layer Convolutional Neural Network for CIFAR-10
and MNIST respectively. Furthermore, we use the same L∞ limits, where the
MNIST attack was set to 0.3 and CIFAR-10 was set to 0.03137255 (equivalent
to 8 out of 255 in the per-pixel range). In contrast however, we only use 5
particles in our implementation whereas Bhagoji et al. used 100. As we show
in Section 6.2.2, we achieve higher success rates with much smaller swarms.
For all MNIST evaluations, we use an initial block-size of 2 without requiring
to increase the granularity. For CIFAR-10, we use an initial block-size of 8.
To test the wide-applicability of the attack, we evaluate its effectiveness
on two additional models for CIFAR-10 and MNIST. We first evaluate the
attacks on the same models used in [2, 11, 12]; we refer the readers to Carlini
and Wagner’s paper [11] for more details. For CIFAR-10, we also test the
attack on a CNN-Capsule model trained with data augmentation as described
by Sabour et al. [71], which achieves a test set accuracy of 82.43%. Further-
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more, we evaluate AdversarialPSO on MNIST using a Hierarchical Recurrent
Neural Network [43] with an accuracy of 98.64%. We also test the attack
on an adversarially trained CIFAR-10 ResNet classier as was done in [52], by
using the same pretrained network provided by MadryLab1. The results for
the wide-applicability test, including the attack on the adversarially trained
CIFAR-10 ResNet model, are reported in Section 6.2.5
To demonstrate the effect of using larger swarms on the generated adversar-
ial examples, we re-run the untargeted Imagenet experiment with differently-
sized swarms. We report the average per-pixel L2 distance between input
images and their adversarial counterparts. With the increase in granularity
when using more particles, we show how larger swarms produce adversarial
examples with a lower L2 average. We show the results of this analysis in
Section 6.2.6.
6.2.2 Untargeted MNIST and CIFAR-10
To demonstrate the effectiveness of AdversarialPSO, we compare our attack
against the approach used by Bhagoji et al. [6]. As shown in Tables 6.1 and 6.2,
AdversarialPSO not only outperforms the standard PSO used by Bhagoji et
al., it also outperforms the GE approach used by the authors. For MNIST, the
only approach to have a higher success-rate is the Iterative Finite Difference
attack at 100%, however the average number of queries was above 60K. In our
implementation, we set a maximum budget of 10K queries, therefore for many
of the samples that was deemed successful in the Iterative Finite Difference
attack, we would have considered as failed in our implementation for passing
the query budget.
Regarding the average L2, using a swarm with 5 particles produces ad-
versarial examples with comparable distances. However, by increasing the
number of particles in the swarm, better quality adversarial examples could
be generated at the expense of more queries. Repeating the same experiment
but with 10 particles produces an average L2 of 4.9, but with an average of
296 queries.
Similarly for CIFAR-10, the only two approaches to have higher success
rates are the iterative GE and iterative Finite Difference, both of which how-
ever, have much higher query averages. As previously mentioned, we use a
1https://github.com/MadryLab/cifar10_challenge
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query budget of 10,000 queries and accordingly, for many of the samples that
have been considered successfully attacked in the iterative GE and iterative
Finite Difference attacks, we would have considered to have failed.
In examining the failed instances of the CIFAR-10 ResNet-32 model, we
find that samples that failed were resistant to small perturbations. Particle
movements had a low impact on the model’s confidence scores and as such,
executed for a large number of iterations until the the query budget was ex-
hausted. Interestingly, for a majority of the samples however, the adversarial
examples were crafted rather quickly without using much queries. This makes
us wonder about the position of the failed instances in the search space with
respect to the decision boundary. We believe those instances were located so
far away from the decision boundary such that large changes were required
for them to be misclassified. Figure 6.1 shows randomly chosen examples of
attacks on both CIFAR-10 and MNIST.
Before After Before After Before After Before After
Deer Bird Airplane Automobile 1 2 8 2
Dog Cat Dog Horse 1 7 5 8
Frog Deer Horse Deer 7 2 2 0
Dog Cat Truck Automobile 6 2 4 8
Dog Ship Frog Ship 4 8 1 4
Figure 6.1: Untargeted attack using AdversarialPSO on MNIST and CIFAR-
10
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Success Rate Avg. L2 Avg. Queries
Finite Diff 86% 410.3 6144
GE 66.8% 402.7 768
Iterative Finite Diff 100% 65.7 61440
Iterative GE 99.0% 80.5 7680
Their PSO 89.2% 262.3 7700
SPSA 88.0% 44.4 7680
AdversarialPSO 94.9% 336 129
Table 6.1: Results comparison: Untargeted attack on CIFAR-10 against the
PSO and GE attacks of Bhagoji et al. [6]. The results we list for the Bhagoji
attacks are obtained from their paper
Success Rate Avg. L2 Avg. Queries
Finite Diff 92.9% 6.1 1568
GE 61.5% 6.0 196
Iterative Finite Diff 100% 2.1 62720
Iterative GE 98.4% 1.9 8000
Their PSO 84.1% 5.3 10000
SPSA 96.7% 3.9 8000
AdversarialPSO 98.5% 5.3 183
Table 6.2: Results comparison: Untargeted attack MNIST against the PSO
and GE attacks of Bhagoji et al. [6]. The results we list for the Bhagoji attacks
are obtained from their paper
6.2.3 Untargeted Imagenet
To evaluate the attack on the Imagenet dataset, we use the InceptionV3 model
provided by Keras2. As per the Keras implementation, inputs are scaled to
[-1,1], we therefore set the L∞ bound to 0.1 (equivalent to the 0.05 used by
related work). We choose the first 1000 samples from the indices list found
in the Parsimonious Black-Box Attack GitHub page3 and attack each sample
with a query budget of 10,000 queries. We also use 32 for an initial block-size,
2https://keras.io/applications/\#inceptionv3
3https://github.com/snu-mllab/parsimonious-blackbox-attack
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similar to [52] and 10 particles in the swarm. The results for the untargeted
attack on Imagenet are shown in Table 6.3 and Figure 6.2 shows randomly
chosen examples of the images generated from the attack. As shown in the
table, our attack achieves comparable success rates and number of queries as
the related work, but with the advantage of providing controllable trade-offs
between the number of queries and the quality of the adversarial examples.
Attack Success Rate Avg. Queries
NES 80.3% 1660
Bandits 94.9% 1030
Parsimonious attack 98.5% 722
AdversarialPSO 96.9% 837
Table 6.3: Untargeted attack on Imagenet
Before After Before After
Anole Lacerta viridis Screw Dumbbell
Totem pole Pinwheel Admiral Argiope aurantia
Pirate ship Water tower Triumphal arch Footstall
Figure 6.2: Untargeted attacks using AdversarialPSO on InceptionV3
6.2.4 Targeted Imagenet
To evaluate AdversarialPSO in a targeted attack, we use samples from the
Parsimonious Black-box Attack’s list of sample indices and we use the same
labels as in [52]. Furthermore, similar to [52], we use an initial block-size of 32
and a query budget of 100,000 queries. We also use 10 particles as was done
in the untargeted attack on Imagenet. Table 6.4 summarizes our results and
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Figure 6.4 shows randomly chosen examples of the attack.
Attack Success Rate Avg. Queries
NES 99.7% 16284
Bandits 92.3% 26421
Parsimonious attack 99.9% 7485
AdversarialPSO 98.6% 14959
Table 6.4: Targeted attack on Imagenet
Before After Before After
Indian cobra Ring snake Hammer King snake
Panpipe Goldfish Soap dispenser Killer whale
Binder Desktop computer Stingray Anemone
Figure 6.3: Targeted attacks using AdversarialPSO on InceptionV3
6.2.5 Wide Applicability of AdversarialPSO
As shown in Table 6.5, AdversarialPSO is effective on different architectures
as the attack was able to generate adversarial examples with high success
rates and low queries. The lowest success rate in this evaluation occurred
when attacking the CNN-Capsule, or CapsNet, which incorporates random
data augmentation in the training process. During the attack, we noticed
that for this model, perturbations had less of an affect on the model’s output,
which caused the attack to exhaust the query budget for 10% of the samples.
Testing the attack on CNN-Capsule without data augmentation, the success
rate went up to 94.1% with the average queries being 199, which shows that
training with augmented samples does help in making the model more robust
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against perturbations.
MNIST
Model Success Rate Avg. L2 Avg. Queries
C&W 99.0% 5.3 172
HRNN 98.46% 3.9 30
CIFAR-10
Model Success Rate Avg. L2 Avg. Queries
C&W 94.0% 1.4 332
CNN-Capsule 90.0% 1.3 214
Table 6.5: AdversarialPSO Wide-Applicability Evaluation Results
To test the attack against defended models, we evaluate AdversarialPSO
against the adversarially trained CIFAR-10 model provided by MadryLabs.
We use the same samples, L∞ bound, and query budgets as used in [52]. The
results are shown in Table 6.6.
Attack Success Rate Avg. Queries
NES 29.5% 2872
Bandits 38.6% 1877
Parsimonious attack 48% 1261
AdversarialPSO 45.4% 2341
Table 6.6: Untargeted attack on adversarially trained CIFAR-10 ResNet
classier
As seen in the table, AdversarialPSO outperforms both Bandits and NES
in terms of success rate and average number of queries. Although the Parsimo-
nious Black-box attack remains the highest in success rate, AdversarialPSO
performs comparably with the added advantage of providing a trade-off be-
tween queries and L2.
6.2.6 Swarm-size Analysis
By re-running the untargeted Imagenet attack using swarms with different
sizes, we show that increasing the number of particles lowers the average L2
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at the expense of more queries. The results are based on samples that were
successfully attacked by all swarm sizes. As shown in Figure 6.4, there is a
15% improvement in adversarial example quality when increasing the number
of particles from 5 to 20, at the cost of using 33% more queries. With this
trade-off, an attacker that favors adversarial example quality over number of
queries can use larger swarms. On the other hand, if fewer queries is more
important to the attacker, then smaller swarms would be more beneficial.
Figure 6.4: The effect of swarm size on the average number of queries and per-
pixel L2 distance. In the figure, the x-axis represents the number of queries,




Our current implementation of the AdversarialPSO attack executes sequen-
tially, where particles are looped through and moved one by one. This design
choice was made to evaluate the speed of the attacks with the least amount
of resources. A natural next step is to parallelize the process by dividing the
particles among multiple CPU or GPU cores, allowing for faster execution of
bigger swarms. It would not, however, affect either the L2 difference between
the adversarial examples and their inputs nor the number of queries submitted
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to the target if the swarm size remains unchanged.
An extension to PSO is Multi-Swarm Optimization (MSO), which uses
multiple sub-swarms instead of a single swarm. Using MSO with different
starting points could help cover more areas of the search space and eventually
find better adversarial examples; it, however, would add to the total number of
queries if each MSO swarm is the same size as the PSO swarm. Alternatively,
smaller sub-swarms can be used in MSO so that the total number of particles
remains unchanged.
Having multiple sub-swarms also allows the use of different fitness func-
tions or different swarm configurations. The sub-swarms could apply different
distance penalties, mutate particles more or mutate them less, have different
step sizes or have different exploitation/exploration/inertia weights. Sharing
the same starting point but with different configurations could allow better
exploration of different regions of the search space.
6.3.2 Limitations of Gradient-Based Attacks
Launching gradient-based black-box attacks could be made with or without
using a local surrogate; both approaches have their limitations. First and fore-
most, when using a local surrogate that approximates the target, the success
of the attack depends on the precision and efficacy of several intermediary
steps that could affect the overall attack. The attacker must have a tight ap-
proximation of the target trained locally, and the adversarial examples must
successfully transfer from the surrogate to the remote target. As demonstrated
in [12], transfer-based attacks achieve low success rates when training on a sur-
rogate in a black-box setting. This could be attributed to a poorly trained
local surrogate that produces adversarial examples incapable of transferring
to the remote target.
Alternatively, a gradient-based black-box attack could be launched directly
on the target by estimating the gradients as was done by ZOO, NES, and
Bandits. Although the attacks do generate high-quality adversarial examples,
they would either require a large number of queries to do so or would be mostly
dependable on the hyperparameter values chosen for the attack. Submitting
multitudes of queries to the target is impractical in a real-world attack, as
that would easily be noticed by an operator that is monitoring the volume of
incoming queries. Furthermore, depending on multiple hyperparameters could
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require tuning, which might not be possible in a real-world attack. The PSO
approach thus appears to offer a better trade-off in this setting, where it more
quickly converges to high-quality but non-optimal examples. Considering that
a black-box scenario is a more likely setting, particularly in security-sensitive
settings, attacks must be able to generate adversarial examples with a realistic
number of queries without requiring tuning the attack to the target.
6.3.3 Large-Scale Adversarial Attacks
The AdversarialPSO attack we present in this dissertation provides the op-
portunity for attackers to launch large-scale attacks on remote targets that
host model for high-dimensional datasets. Due to the nature of the attack, it
can be easily scaled not only on a single machine by increasing particles, but
across multiple machines that share a common target. We anticipate future
attacks on machine learning models not to be launched from a single source
but from multiple sources working in conjunction. In a sense, it is similar to
botnets, where a large group of zombie bots are utilized for a single purpose.
The AdversarialPSO attack provides the foundation for such attacks, where
tens of thousands of particles can be launched by multiple attackers. Note
that PSO does not require a GPU for efficient computation, making it more
suitable for this setting than gradient-based techniques, since the capabilities
of the bots are more likely to be limited.
As we have seen in our experiments, using more significant swarms pro-
vides the capacity to generate adversarial examples with shorter L2 distances.
Therefore, by pooling resources together, a group of attackers can launch more
powerful attacks that can generate adversarial examples that are increasingly
harder to distinguish from their respective inputs. Such an attack could be
scaled to accommodate inputs with higher dimensions and produce adversarial
examples on models that are currently difficult to attack, such as those that
are trained on 8K resolution images.
Additionally, as the bot nodes would likely be located in different geo-
graphical locations, monitoring incoming queries would be more complicated
than if the attack is originating from a single host. Furthermore, decoy queries
could be launched to confuse the target as to which entities are part of the
attack. It could also be achieved by controlling the rate of queries being sub-
mitted by any single source, where queries are to be submitted in a specific
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order, at different times, or in random bursts.
Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
7.1 Conclusion
In this dissertation, we present a black-box attack on ML models based on
the evolutionary search algorithm Particle Swarm Optimization. Using this
attack, we show that despite their high accuracy, classification models can be
subverted by adversarial examples. We test attacks for both malware detection
and image classification, and we show that in both domains, regardless of their
inherent differences, models can still be fooled by specially crafted inputs.
For the malware classification model, we assume a behavioral-based target
that utilizes API call sequences to classify software as malicious or benign.
Attacks in this domain commonly employ an insertion technique that limits
perturbations to feature additions to avoid disrupting the malware’s original
functionality. The API calls being inserted are null APIs, or no-ops, that have
no functional effect, and would thus not change malware behavior. However,
these methods can be detected using non-ML techniques by analyzing the
inputs of these null APIs. For that reason, we chose to explore a more robust
attack that generates adversarial examples by replacing API calls with other
functionally-equivalent APIs.
To launch our attack against the API-based malware detection models,
we first employ unsupervised learning techniques to find API call mappings
that can be used in the attack. We apply these techniques on both API
documentation and code, and in doing so, we were able to extract over 300
1-to-1 API mappings on the Windows platform. Using these mappings, we
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generated adversarial examples from 28% of the malware samples in the our
test set, outperforming a white-box gradient-based attack that share the same
constraints.
In addition to attacking malware detection models, we also show in this
dissertation the success of our attack against image classification models. Mal-
ware and images are inherently different, nonetheless, our attack successfully
generated adversarial examples in both domains. To attack image classifica-
tion models, we use query-reduction techniques such as the exploitation of the
spacial relationship between pixels, minimizing redundant changes between
particles, and using the edge of the L∞ ball when perturbing inputs. With
these techniques, and by using multiple benchmarks, we show that Adversar-
ialPSO performs comparably to the state-of-the-art and is able to generate
adversarial examples with a limited query budget.
7.2 Future Work
The black-box attack we propose in this dissertation can be enhanced to be-
come more powerful and more robust against defenses. The avenues we plan
to explore to advance this attack are as following:
• This attack against the malware detection model can be further en-
hanced by extracting additional mappings. As our current attack only
uses 1-to-1 mappings to perturb malware, a natural next step is to find
1-to-n, n-to-1, and n-to-n mappings that expands the search space for ad-
versarial examples. These mappings are single API calls that can replace
multiple consecutive calls (1-to-n), multiple calls that can be replaced by
a single call (n-to-1), or multiple API calls that can be replaced by an-
other sequence of API calls that perform the same functionally (n-to-n).
Although finding such mappings would certainly enhance the efficacy of
the attack, we leave this exploration for future work.
• In this dissertation, we focus on dynamic-based malware detection mod-
els that are trained on software behavior. Another type of malware
detection models are ones that are trained on static-based features. The
attack we propose can also be used on these models by replacing low-
level assembly instructions found in malware binaries with equivalent
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instructions. This type of manipulation is already exploited by meta-
morphic engines that modify malware samples to evade signature-based
detection. However, these engines modify malware randomly and are
not sufficient on their own to evade the detection of ML models. Our
AdversarialPSO attack can be used to guide the manipulations made by
the metamorphic engines to evade, not only signature-based detectors,
but also ML-based models. We plan to explore this avenue further in
future work.
• For the image classification attack, the main benefit we provide is the
controllable trade-off between the number of queries and the quality
of the adversarial examples. By using larger swarms, higher quality
adversarial examples can be generated at the expense of more queries
being submitted to the model. This property can be exploited to the
extreme by launching a large-scale distributed attack from multiple re-
mote origins, similar to how botnets operate. In launching a massive
distributed attack, high-quality adversarial examples can be generated
with a smaller detectable footprint, as the attack is launched from mul-
tiple different sources. It also allows the attack to be scaled to high-
dimensional targets, such as models trained on 4K or 8K image, as these
large inputs can be divided amongst all participants of the distributed
attack. We leave the exploration of this large-scale distributed attack to
future work.
• For both the malware and image classification attacks, other variants of
PSO can be explored for further improvements. For example, an exten-
sion to PSO is Multi-Swarm Optimization (MSO), which uses multiple
sub-swarms instead of a single swarm. Using MSO with different start-
ing points could help cover more areas of the search space and eventually
find better adversarial examples. Furthermore, another avenue is to uti-
lize multiple sub-swarms that allow the use of different fitness functions
or different swarm configurations. The sub-swarms could apply different
distance penalties, mutate particles more or mutate them less, have dif-
ferent step sizes or have different exploitation/exploration/inertia weights.
These different variants of PSO could provide added benefits and en-
hance the overall performance of the attack. We leave this exploration
however, for future work.
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